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THE RIGHT TO DIE IN NORTH DAKOTA: THE NORTH
DAKOTA LIVING WILL ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
A. IN RE BAYER: A FIRST LOOK AT AN INCOMPETENT'S
RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT IN NORTH DAKOTA
On April 13, 1986, sixty-one year old lone Bayer suffered a
severe heart attack which caused her to stop breathing for at least
twenty five minutes.' During these twenty-five minutes, Mrs.
Bayer's brain was severely damaged due to lack of both oxygen
and blood flow necessary to sustain normal brain functions. 2 As a
result of this brain damage Mrs. Bayer's level of brain functioning
was reduced to a "persistive vegetative state" where the capacity
for body movement is diminished to reflex motions only, and the
individual is incapable of any emotional functioning.3 This "persis-
tent vegetative state" necessitated the use of a nasogastric tube
which enabled Mrs. Bayer to receive nutrition and hydration.4
Prior to her heart attack, Mrs. Bayer had frequently and ada-
mantly spoken to her family and friends of her opposition to being
kept alive by respirators, ventilators, or other life prolonging
machines.5 Mrs. Bayer was unambiguous about her feelings
against being kept alive through the use of life-prolonging meas-
ures should she become incompetent and unable to care for her-
self.6 However, Mrs. Bayer had not taken any affirmative step to
1. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 3.
2. Id. The cerebral cortex of Mrs. Bayer's brain was damaged as a result of blood and
oxygen deprivation. Id. This portion of the brain controls cognitive functions,
consciousness, awareness, emotion, feeling, thinking, seeing, and hearing. Id.
3. In re Bayer, at 4. Persistent vegetative state has been described as follows:
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its
internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heartbeat and
pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex
activity of muscles and nerves for low level condition responses. But there is no
behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in
a learned manner.
In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, -, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987) (quoting Dr. Fred Plum's testimony
offered at the lobes trial).
4. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 4. A nasogastric
feeding tube is inserted into the nose, and runs through the posterior pharanyx and
esophagus and into the stomach, allowing water and nutrition to be introduced into an
individuals stomach or intestine through the tube. See THE HASTINGS CENTER,
GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF
THE DYING, 59-62 (1987).
5. Telephone interview with Ruth Sharp, Mrs Bayer's daughter (May 11, 1990). In the
few days following that visit, as lone Bayer watched her sister in law die, lone Bayer clearly
and unequivocally expressed to both her family members and numerous friends that she
did not ever want her life sustained by machines or by any other artificial means. Id.
6. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 5. The Bayer court
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ensure that her wishes would be respected in the event of her
incompetency. 7 In order to respect Mrs. Bayer's wishes, her fam-
ily was required to petition for the appointment of a guardian.'
The guardianship was granted to Mrs. Bayer's husband Lyle, and
on September 25, 1986, he petitioned the court for an order
authorizing removal of the nasogastric feeding tube.9
The Bayer Court examined several factors to determine
whether such an order should be granted.' ° These factors
included: 1) Mrs. Bayer's extensive and irreversible brain damage,
which left her incapable of experiencing feelings or emotions or
physical sensations of pain, hunger or thirst;1 2) Mrs. Bayer's right
to refuse life prolonging treatment, which could be asserted by her
guardian; 12 3) the societal interest in preserving or prolonging a
life; 13 and, 4) the prospect of continual medical treatment, which
the Court found to be both intrusive and invasive where there was
no chance for recovery.' 4 The Court balanced these four factors
and on February 5, 1987 granted Mr. Bayer's petition for an order
authorizing removal of his wife's feeding tube.' 5
heard testimony from several family members regarding the prolonging of lone Bayer's life
through artificial means. Id. The testimony revealed Mrs. Bayer's strong opinions against
life support systems and contained specific references to her desire not to be maintained in
that manner if she were in a position where she could not enjoy a cognitive existence. Id.
Family members agreed unequivocally that Mrs. Bayer would adamantly reject any effort
to artificially maintain her life in its present form. Id.
7. See generally In re. Bayer, No. 87-4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987). At
the time Mrs. Bayer became incapacitated, it was possible to plan ahead for incapacity
through the use of a Durable Power of Attorney. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-30-01 to -05
(Supp. 1989). The Durable Power of Attorney allows the appointment of a proxy or
surrogate decisionmaker remaining effective even after the principal's incapacity. Id. But
see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990). The United States
Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not forbid Missouri to require that evidence
of an incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 2843.
8. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 1.
9. Id. at 1. In authorizing Mr. Bayer to seek the removal of his wife's feeding tube, the
Bayer court relied on In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984). In Torres, the Minnesota
Supreme Court found that a probate court had the authority to authorize the request by a
conservator for the removal of a conservatee's life support systems. Id. at 337.
10. In re Bayer, No. 87-4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 19. The Bayer
court reviewed existing right to refuse medical treatment decisions in the process of
making the determination to allow the removal of Mrs. Bayer's feeding tube. Id. at 7-19.
11. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 19.
12. Id.
13. Id. In looking at the societal interest in preserving or prolonging a life, the Court
balanced four state interests. Id. at 7. These interests include: -1) The state's interest in
preserving life; 2) Protection of innocent third parties; 3) Prevention of suicide; and, 4) [the]
Maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession." Id. The state's concern for
the preservation and sanctity of all life is balanced with a concern for the individual in
question. Id.
14. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 19.
15. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 20. The Bayer
court gave Lyle Bayer, Mrs. Bayer's husband and guardian, the authorization to request the
removal of her nasogastric tube. Id.
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Following the court order of February 5, 1987, Mrs. Bayer's
nasogastric tube was removed.'" Acting independently, her
attending physician ordered the use of a second type of force feed-
ing mechanism, a tracheostomy, which enabled Mrs. Bayer to
reflexively "swallow" her food.17 Neither Mrs. Bayer's husband
nor the other family members were aware of the decision to insert
the tracheostomy until after it was implemented.' 8 Upon learning
of this procedure, Mr. Bayer petitioned the court for permission to
remove the cuffed tracheostomy.' 9 At the hearing, the physician
and the nursing home asserted that the tracheostomy allowed Mrs.
Bayer to ingest food by swallowing rather than by force.2 ° Both
the physician and the nursing home contended that Mrs. Bayer's
ability to swallow significantly changed the issues being considered
by the court.2'
The court reviewed the feeding process involved with the cuf-
fed tracheostomy and concluded that the placement of food and
water by a syringe into Mrs. Bayer's mouth, and her reflexive
response of swallowing, was not a natural process and did not indi-
cate a higher level of brain functioning than exhibited while the
nasogastric tube was in place.22 The court found the tracheostomy
as an artificial feeding method to be both intrusive and invasive
and affirmed the original decision of February 5, 1987.23
It took the Bayer family almost two years to work through the
judicial and medical restraints which had prevented Mrs. Bayer's
right to self determination from being exercised.24 In the Bayer
16. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Dec. 11, 1987) at 1.
17. Id. The attending physician ordered the use of a cuffed tracheostomy tube. Id.
The cuffed tracheostomy tube allowed feeding by the "depositing of pureed and blended
foods in [Mrs. Bayer's] mouth coincidental with the inflation of a balloon in the cuffed tube."
Id. "The balloon prevent[ed] entry of food or liquids into [Mrs. Bayer's] lungs." Id.
18. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Dec. 11, 1987) at 1.
19. Id.
20. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Dec. 11, 1987) at 3.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 7-8. The court considered testimony from the nursing home nursing staff and
Mrs. Bayer's daughter, Ruth Sharp, also a nurse. Id. at 5. Mrs. Sharp was experienced in the
use of tracheostomies and characterized its use here as "forced feeding." Id. at 6. She
added that her mother would not be able to ingest food without the use of the tracheostomy
or another artificial feeding device. Id.
23. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Dec. 11, 1987) at 7. Following the
December 1987 court order, both the physician and the nursing home continued to refuse
to permit removal of Mrs. Bayer's feeding tube. Telephone interview with Ruth Sharp,
Mrs. Bayer's daughter (May 11, 1990). The family wrote almost 200 letters over the next
few months, attempting to locate another physician who would comply with the court
order. Id. In February 1988, one physician agreed to accept Mrs. Bayer as a patient,
conditioned upon his anonymity. Id. On March 18, 1988, Mrs. Bayer was transported to
her daughter's home, and under the care of the anonymous physician and the local hospice,
quietly died 12 days later, on March 30. Id.
24. Telephone interview with Ruth Sharp, Mrs. Bayer's daughter (May 11, 1990). Mrs.
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opinion, Burleigh County Court Judge Burt Riskedahl noted the
difficulties in deciding right to die issues not previously dealt with
by a judicial forum in North Dakota.2" The Judge also noted the
absence of a state living will statute addressing the right to refuse
life sustaining treatment through artificial means, which could
have provided the court with guidance with the Bayer decision.26
In 1986, at the time of this tragedy, North Dakota was one of only
eleven states without living will legislation. It would be another
three years before legislation of this type was available to the citi-
zens of North Dakota.28  Additionally, once available, North
Dakota's Living Will Act did not include nutrition and hydration
within the definition of "life-prolonging treatment. ' 29 Neverthe-
less, the statute is a significant part of the continuing process of
defining and clarifying an individual's right to control medical
treatment decisions.
Four years after In re Bayer, the United States Supreme Court
addressed right to die issues for the first time in a case from Mis-
souri in which the family of a young woman in a persistent vegeta-
tive state sought termination of artificial nutrition and hydration.3 °
The Court held that the Constitution permitted Missouri to refuse
to accept the families substituted judgment for Nancy Beth
Cruzan without clear and convincing evidence that she wished to
have life sustaining treatment withdrawn if she were in a persis-
tent vegetative state.31 However, all but one member of the
Court recognized a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment.32 O'Connor's concurring
decision in Cruzan reinforces the importance of the North Dakota
Bayer entered a persistent vegetative state in April of 1986 following her heart attack and
the final decision authorizing the removal of her feeding mechanism came on December
11, 1987. See In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct.) Feb. 5, Dec. 11, 1987.
25. In re Bayer, No, 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 5.
26. Id.
27. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS, 28-29
(1987 ed.) Prior to North Dakota's law, 39 other states had passed living will legislation.
These include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id.
28. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (Supp. 1989).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(4XSupp. 1989).
30. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
31. Id. at 2854.
32. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2863 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia asserts that there is no constitutionally protected Due Process
liberty interest at issue in Cruzan. Id. There are "reasonable and humane limits that ought
not to be exceeded in requiring an individual to preserve his own life... but they are not
set forth in the Due Process Clause." Id.
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Living Will legislation in authorizing a certain means of providing
clear and convincing evidence on the basis of which substituted
judgment can be exercised on behalf of an incompetent patient. 3
Cruzan also makes it clear that the Living Will authorized by the
North Dakota Statute is merely an alternative, not an exclusive,
means by which such evidence may be provided.3 a
This Note will review the North Dakota Living Will Act,
enacted by the 1989 North Dakota legislature, and the rights avail-
able to North Dakotans who execute a living will pursuant to the
Act. The Note will include a discussion of the history of the living
will movement, including the right to self determination and its
limitations as have been determined by both the common law and
the North Dakota legislature. Additionally, this Note will include a
discussion of the doctrine of substituted judgment and the doc-
trine of informed consent as the basis for many common law right
to die decisions, and compare these doctrines with the provisions
of the North Dakota Living Will Act. Finally, this Note will com-
pare the provisions of the North Dakota Living Will Act with three
major areas concerned with the right to die in an effort to deter-
mine the scope and applicability of the Act: 1) common law right
to die decisions; 2) the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act,35
upon which North Dakota's Act was based; and 3) living will stat-
utes from other states.
36
II. THE COMMON-LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
OF SELF DETERMINATION IN MEDICAL
DECISIONMAKING
A. PRIMARY RIGHT OF COMPETENT PATIENTS
Individual autonomy, personal liberty and the right of self-
determination are concepts of long standing importance in our
Anglo-American legal tradition.
33. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (1989).
34. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2857-58 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
35. See, SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 135-47
(1987 ed.). A Uniform Living Will Act was drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its Annual Conference in 1985. Id. at 135. The
North Dakota Living Will Act is based largely on the Uniform Living Will Act. Compare
UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 609 (Supp. 1987) with N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-06.4-01 to -05 (1989).
36. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS, p. 28-29
(1987 ed.).
37. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 271 (43 Great Books of the Western World) (R. Hutchins
ed. 1952). Mill, discussing the right to self-determination, notes:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
1990]
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The concepts of autonomy, liberty and self-determination are
especially important where an individual's right to seek or refuse
medical treatment is affected. 38 The right to seek or refuse medi-
cal treatment presents dificult and demanding legal issues which
require more than "mechanical reliance on legal doctrine. ' 39 In
considering medical treatment issues courts have recognized the
requirement of informed consent to medical care and a right to
privacy which arises both from the common law and the
Constitution.4 °
1. The Doctrine of Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent is a common-law doctrine
which protects the personal integrity of an individual's body.4 '
The doctrine of informed consent essentially provides that no
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because
it will make him happier, because in the opinion of other, to do so would be wise,
or even right.
Id. Mill goes on in his classic defense of personal autonomy where he discusses the scope of
personal liberty:
The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his inde-
pendence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign.
Id. In addition to Mill, the United States Supreme Court discussed the importance of indi-
vidual liberty and self-determination as early as 1891. Union Pac. By. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891). In Botsford the court declared: "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id.
38. See id.
39. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, -, 370
N.E.2d 417, 422 (1977).
40. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2847 (1990) (the
Constitutional right of bodily integrity is contained in the requirement of informed
consent). See id. at 2846 (the right to bodily integrity is the logical corollary of the informed
consent requirement). For a further discussion of the doctrine of informed consent, see
infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207,
741 P.2d 674 (1987); Barber v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484
(1983); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re Farrell, 108 N.J.
335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921,
(Fla. 1984) (the right of a patient to refuse medical treatment arises both from the common
law and the unwritten and penumbra constitutional right to privacy). See also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The constitutional basis for the right to privacy exists in
the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, "formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance." Id. at 484. The Griswold court
recognized the unwritten constitutional right to privacy with regard to contraception and
its relationship to family life and personal choice. Id. at 485. This recognition was
expanded in a later case, where the rights to terminate a pregnancy were included within
the penumbra of privacy rights afforded by the constitution. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
41. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (discussing the doctrine of
informed consent in the context of the decision to withhold medical treatment).
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medical procedure may be performed without a patient's con-
sent.42 This consent must be obtained after explanation of the
nature of the treatment, substantial risks, and alternative thera-
pies.43 The doctrine of informed consent contains three elements:
1) The patient must have the capacity to reason and make judg-
ments; 2) the patient must be able to make decisions voluntarily;
and 3) the patient must have a clear understanding of the risks and
benefits of the proposed treatment alternatives. 44 Generally, it is
the physician's duty to provide necessary medical facts, and it is
the patient's role to accept or reject treatment based on those
facts. 45 The integrity of the doctrine of informed consent is jeop-
ardized when a patient is incompetent and unable to make deci-
sions or understand the risks of medical treatment.
B. LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
WHEN MAKING MEDICAL DECISIONS FOR AN
INCOMPETENT PERSON
When an individual is unable to make an "informed consent"
because of incompetency, the doctrine of substituted judgment
has enabled surrogate decisionmakers to make medical decisions,
protecting the incompetent's right of self determination.46 In
1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re Quinlan."
The Quinlan court was asked to decide whether the right of pri-
vacy, to seek or refuse extraordinary medical treatment, could be
asserted by a third person on behalf of an incompetent individ-
ual.48 Joseph Quinlan had petitioned the court to be given the
power to authorize removal of Karen's artificial life support upon
42. Id. at 1222 (quoting Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical
Treatment: Bodily Integrity versus The Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 237
(1973)).
43. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily
Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 237 (1973). In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, -, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985) (quoting Cantor, noted that the
doctrine of informed consent is the primary means to protect the personal integrity of one's
body).
44. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, -, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985) (quoting Wanzer,
Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig and Van Eys, The
Physicians' Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 955, 957
(1984Xnoting that the prerequisite to informed consent is the patient's competence, and an
evaluation of the risks and benefits of medical treatment, based on the information
necessary to make an informed decision)).
45. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, -, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985) (quoting Hilfiker,
Sounding Board: Allowing the Debilitated to Die, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 716, 718 (1983)).
Physicians may "phrase options, stress information, and present .. . advice" having
tremendous influence in determining a patient's chosen course of treatment. Id.
46. See generally In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, -, 486 A.2d 1209, 1227 (1985).
47. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
48. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 651.
1990]
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which she was dependant.49  The New Jersey Supreme Court
found that Karen's right to seek or refuse medical treatment was
present regardless of her competency,50 and gave Joseph Quinlan
the authority to make medical decisions as to the choice of Karen's
treating physicians.5 1 The "seminal" decision in Quinlan was a
significant advancement in the area of right to die decision mak-
ing, characterized by the Supreme Court in Cruzan as the right to
refuse treatment.52
Since In re Quinlan was decided in 1976, several state cases
have addressed the guardian's right to make medical decisions for
an incompetent person.53 These cases have held that the right to
self-determination contains some important limitations. The com-
mon-law decisions which have addressed the right to self determi-
nation of medical treatment decisions have identified four
competing state interests which limit the right to self-determina-
tion in seeking or refusing medical treatment.5 4 These states
interests include: 1) the preservation of life; 2) the protection of
interests of innocent third parties; 3) the prevention of suicide; and
4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion.55 Of these four interests, the state's interest in preserving life
is properly accorded the greatest weight in right to die cases.56
49. Id. On the night of April 15, 1975, after two fifteen minute periods of breathing
cessation, Karen Quinlan was admitted, unconscious to Newton Memorial Hospital. Id. at
-, 355 A.2d at 653-654. She entered a comatose state, and was characterized by physicians
as being in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 654. Karen required a
respirator to assist her breathing due to the vegetative state. Id. at __, 355 A.2d at 655.
Periodically unsuccessful attempts were made to wean Karen from the respirator. Id.
Karen's treating physicians testified that she could not continue to breathe without the
respirator. Id.
50. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 664.
51. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 671. On March 31, 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court
named Joseph Quinlan guardian of his daughter Karen, with full power to consult with
physicians in making her medical decisions. Id.
52. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2847 (1990).
53. See, e.g., In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) (giving the
guardian the authority to request that artificial feeding tube be removed, and artificial
feeding be discontinued); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497
N.E.2d 626 (1986) (setting aside lower court decision enjoining guardian of terminally ill
incompetent individual from authorizing the removal of an artificial feeding device and
ordering hospital to assist guardian in transferring the patient to a facility where device
could be removed); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (noting that family
members are in the best position to make medical decisions for relatives who have become
incompetent).
54. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 7. See also
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, __, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977)
(the Bayer court listed the same four state interests as the Saikewicz court).
55. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 7; Superintendent
of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, __, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977).
56. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) at 7. The
individual's medical condition and prognosis are important considerations when balancing
the state interest in preserving life against the right to refuse treatment. Id. at 8. The Bayer
court recognized that the state's interest in protecting and preserving life is weakened
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The state's interest in preserving life must be considered
when a terminal affliction "indicates that life will soon, and inevita-
bly, be extinguished."-" This is particularly true for an incompe-
tent terminally ill patient when treatment of the disease or
condition may be more painful and terrifying than the terminal
illness.58 Medical treatment to prolong life may only serve to pro-
long the suffering of the patient.5 9 Further, medical treatment
may "isolate the (patient's) family from their loved one at a time
when they may be close at hand.60 Also, extraordinary medical
treatment of a terminally ill patient may result in economic ruin
for the family of the patient.61 Given these ramifications, when a
patient is afflicted with a terminal, incurable illness, declining fur-
ther intrusive or invasive medical treatment may outweigh the
state's interest in preservation of life.62
Recently, the medical profession and the judiciary have recog-
nized and acknowledged that there is an important difference
between curing the ill, and comforting the dying. 3 Health care
professionals, hospitals and nursing homes have been drawing this
distinction, especially with regard to respecting the decision of ter-
minally ill competent patients to refuse life-prolonging
measures.
64
where a terminally ill individual is undergoing intrusive, invasive treatment. Id. (quoting In
re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976)).
57. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425
(1977).
58. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 432 (Saikewicz court considered the unique circumstances
of the patient's mental incompetence and held that the patient would have no
comprehension of the need for treatment, would only suffer confusion and disorientation
and a compounding of his pain and fear and thus trial court properly held that not treating
patient would be in patient's best interests).
59. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 423 (quoting from Lewis, Machine Medicine and Its
Relation to The Fatally Ill, 206 J. AM. MED. A. 387 (1968)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See also, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2869 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan argued that "no State interest could outweigh the rights
of an individual in Nancy Cruzan's position." Id. Nancy Beth Cruzan was in a permanent
vegetative state with no hope of recovery. Id. at 2845.
63. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 47, 355 A.2d 647, 667 (1976). In Quinlan, the New
Jersey Supreme Court observed that the range of options available today to prolong life
requires physicians to "distinguish between curing the ill and comforting and easing the
dying." Id.
64. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, __, 370 N.E.2d 417,
423 (1977) (citing Rabkin, Gillerman & Rice, Orders Not To Resuscitate, 293 NEw. ENG. J.
OF MED. 364 (1976)).
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C. SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING ON BEHALF OF AN
INCOMPETENT PATIENT
1. Substituted Judgment Based on the Wishes of the
Patient
There are two methods used in surrogate decisionmaking.
The first method is the common-law doctrine of "substituted judg-
ment" which has been widely discussed in right to die cases follow-
ing its application in In re Quinlan.6 5 The doctrine of substituted
judgment recognizes that the common-law right to decline life
sustaining treatment exists whether or not the individual is able to
express a preference.66 Further, the doctrine permits family
and/or close friends to render a surrogate decision regarding the
use of life prolonging treatment as the individual would have exer-
cised it.67
The doctrine of substituted judgment is intended to repre-
sent, as closely as possible, the decision that the incompetent indi-
vidual would make if competent. 68
2. Surrogate Decisions Based on the Best Interests of the
Patient
The second method of surrogate decisionmaking is the "best
65. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
66. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976); John F. Kennedy Mem.
Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984). The doctrine of substituted
judgment has been developed through the common law to afford the rights of self-
determination in medical decisions to an incompetent individual. Bludworth, 452 So.2d at
926. The judgment of the individual is made by substitutes or surrogates. Id. Generally the
surrogates include the individual's physician, in consultation with family members or close
friends. Id.
67. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, -, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (1987). The lobes court discussed In
re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1977). lobes, 108 N.J. at __, 529 A.2d at 444. Both
Karen Quinlan and Nancy Jobes were incompetent, in persistent vegetative states and
unable to assert their right to decline life prolonging treatment. Comparejobes, 108 N.J. at
- 529 A.2d at 444 with Quinlan, 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 654. In Quinlan, the court
found that Karen's father had a right to choose her treating physicians, and to consult with
them about her care on her behalf. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 671. The Quinlan
court held that the patient's family members were the proper parties to make a substituted
medical judgment. See ]obes, 108 N.J. at -, 529 A.2d at 444. The lobes court made the
same determination. Id. at 447. The lobes court concluded that "almost invariably the
patient's family has an intimate understanding of the patient's medical attitudes and
general world view and therefore is in the best position to know the motives and
considerations that would control the patient's medical decisions." Id. at 445.
68. lobes, 108 N.J. at -, 529 A.2d at 445. The lobes court recognized that families are
most familiar with the incompetent individual's entire "prior mental life ... philosophical,
religious and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose of life and the way it should
be lived .. " Id. (quoting Newman, Treatment Refusals for the Critically Ill: Proposed
Rules for the Family, the Physician and the State, III N.Y.L.ScH. Hu. RTS. ANNUAL 45-46
(1985)). Families are best qualified to make judgments on behalf of an incompetent person.
lobes, 108 N.J. at -, 529 A.2d at 445.
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interests" analysis.69 The best interests analysis is used in circum-
stances where an individual has never been competent to make
medical decisions, or where the surrogate is unaware of the indi-
vidual's wishes or desires.7 ° Under these circumstances, the surro-
gate decisionmaker must make decisions that seek to implement
what the surrogate "believes would be in the patient's best inter-
ests."17 ' The purpose which underlies the best interests analysis is
the protection of an individual's welfare.7 2 In making a decision in
the best interest of an individual, the surrogate decisionmaker
may take into account certain factors, including 1) the preserva-
tion or restoration of functioning; and 2) the need for relief from
suffering.73
The doctrine of substituted judgment requires the family
and/or close friends making a substituted judgment to consider
the individual's prior statements concerning medical issues or life-
prolonging procedures.74 In the absence of prior statements or
comments, a "best interests analysis" has been used by a substitute
decisionmaker to make medical decisions for an individual who is
no longer able to indicate treatment choices independently.75
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court upheld the Missouri decision
which provided a procedural safeguard for surrogate decisions
made for incompetent patients.7 6 The Supreme Court rejected
the claim that Missouri must accept the substituted judgment of
close family members without clear evidence of the wishes of the
69. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 108 NJ. 532, -, 529 A.2d 434, 457 (1987) (Handler, J.,
concurring); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, -, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985); In re Grant, 109
Wash 2d. 545, 567, 747 P.2d 445, 457 (1987).
70. The Right to Forego Medical Treatments, What are the Legal Limits? 73 Op. Att'y
Gen. 25, 27 (Md. 1988). When a surrogate or substitute decision-maker is unaware of the
patient's wishes or desires, a best interests analysis must be employed. Id.
71. Id. at 27.
72. Id. at 27-28. Although incompetent to make medical decisions, a patient's behavior
may be considered as an indication of his best interests. Id. at 28 n.38. Examples of this
type of behavior would include forcible resistance to the insertion of a feeding tube or a
continued effort to remove a feeding tube in place. Id.
73. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 135 (1983). See also, In re Grant 109 Wash.2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987). In
Grant, the Washington Supreme Court held that it was in the best interest of a 22-year-old
patient suffering from an incurable neurological disorder to have all life-sustaining
procedures, including artificially administered sustenance withheld. Id. at 568, 747 P.2d at
457.
74. John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984). In
Bludworth, the Supreme court of Florida noted that in the context of substituted judgment,
oral or written forms of evidence of the incompetent patient's wishes would be persuasive
evidence of their intentions. Id.
75. In re Grant, 109 Wash.2d 545, 567, 747 P.2d 445, 457 (1987Xnoting that a best
interests analysis is appropriate where the incompetent party had not indicated what
treatment choices they would make if unable to do so because of incompetence).
76. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2852-55 (1990).
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incompetent patient.7 The Court noted that "there is no auto-
matic assurance that the view of close family members will neces-
sarily be the same as the patient's would have been had [the
patient] been confronted with the prospect of [the] situation while
competent. 7 8 While recognizing that many states have less nar-
row procedures for surrogate decisionmaking, the Cruzan court
held that the Constitution did not require Missouri to accept a sur-
rogate decision to discontinue nutrition and hydration in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes.7 9
3. Surrogate Decisionmaking and Living Wills
Some evidence is more probative than other evidence for a
surrogate decisionmaker making an informed consent decision for
an incompetent individual.80 The best evidence for a terminally
ill incompetent individual requiring treatment decisions is a living
will stating specifically the individual's preferences about life-sus-
taining treatment."' Living wills or advanced directives allow
competent persons to assert their legal right to indicate the prefer-
ence for, or against, life-prolonging treatment when no longer
competent and faced with an incurable terminal illness.8 2 The
purpose of living will legislation is to assure that an individual's
treatment preferences are related to, and respected by, health
care providers, family, and guardians after the individual is no
longer able to directly make those decisions.83
Properly executed, the living will is "presumptive evidence of
the declarant's desires concerning the use, withholding, or with-
77. Id. at 2855-56.
78. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990).
79. Id. at 2854. But see id. at 2856 n.12 (the Court reserved the question of whether a
State must defer to a surrogate's decision when clear evidence establishes that the patient
had expressed a desire that the decision to terminate life sustaining treatment be made on
the patient's behalf by a surrogate).
80. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, -, 529 A.2d 419, 426 (1987).
81. Id. See also Saunders v. State, 129 Misc. 2d 45, -, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 517 (Sup. Ct.
1985) (Saunders, living will was clear and convincing evidence of her intention to decline
medical treatment if in a terminal condition). In Saunders, Thelma Saunders executed a
living will through an attorney in Pennsylvania. Id. at -, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 512. She became
ill in New York, prior to the enactment of a living will statute. Id. at -, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 511-
12, 516. In a hearing on the validity and effectiveness of Mrs. Saunder's living will executed
pursuant to Pennsylvania law, the court found that the document was valid as an "Informed
Medical Consent Statement" and could be considered authorization to refuse or
discontinue life-prolonging medical treatment. Id. at -. , 492 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
82. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 6 (1987 ed.)
(noting that living wills have become broadly accepted in recent years due to the growing
awareness of issues surrounding the right to die, through personal experience and growing
media coverage of a number of court cases).
83. Marzen, The "Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act:" A Critical Analysis, 1
ISSUES IN LAW AND MEDICINE 441, 443 (1986).
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drawal of [life prolonging] treatment.... 84 Correspondingly,
those who carry out the provisions in a properly executed living
will are offered certain statutory protections when they do so.8"
III. NORTH DAKOTA'S LIVING WILL LEGISLATION
In view of Cruzan's holding that a state may constitutionally
limit a surrogate decision to discontinue nutrition and hydration to
situations in which there is clear and convincing evidence of a
patient's wishes, such as a living will, North Dakota's statute is of
considerable interest.8 The North Dakota Living Will Act, codi-
fied at Section 23-06.4-01 to -14 of the North Dakota Century
Code was enacted by the 1989 legislative session.87 The North
Dakota Living Will Act is based largely on the Uniform Living Will
Act, adopted in 1985 by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.88 The Uniform Living Will Act form was chosen by the
sponsors of the bill because most of the wording and intent of the
Uniform Act was consistent with the values of the people of North
Dakota.89 The Uniform Act seeks to achieve a simple, consistent,
uniform declaration which can be effective nationwide.9" At the
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-04 (Supp. 1989).
85. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-09 (Supp. 1989). Actions taken pursuant to a valid
living will are not subject to criminal or civil liability. Id.
86. Cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4 (Supp. 1989) (North Dakota's Living Will provides
clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wishes for use by a surrogate decisionmaker).
But see generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990Xnothing in
Cruzan suggests, however, that a living will in compliance with a state statute is the only
possible means to provide clear and convincing evidence of the wishes of the incompetent
patient).
87. The North Dakota's Living Will Act was enacted on April 10, 1989, after House
Bill No. 1481 was passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate of the Fifty-
first Legislative Assembly of North Dakota. 1989 N.D. LAws ch. 309. It became effective
on July 10, 1989. Id.
88. The legislative history of the North Dakota Living Will Act indicates that it was
based on the Uniform Act. See The Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill Act: Hearings on H.B.
1481 Before the Sen. Comm. on Human Serv. and Vet. Affairs, 51st N.D. Legislative Session
(March 3, 1989) (statement by Representative Judy DeMers, prime sponsor of House Bill
1481).
89. Id. Representative DeMers stated that:
The sponsors [of the living will bill] recognize that House Bill 1481 attempts to
resolve very complex legal, personal, moral, medical, and health care issues. In
its development, we utilized the "living'will" bill of [the] last [1987] session,
which was based on the Uniform Law recommended by the National
Commission on Uniform State Laws and which had been modified to meet
concerns relevant to North Dakota....
Id. Among the concerns particular to North Dakota, were the provisions for nutrition,
hydration and comfort care as medical treatment, and the effectiveness of an otherwise
valid declaration during pregnancy. Id.
90. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987). The Prefatory
Note of the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act sets out the purposes of the Act. Id.
These purposes are:
(1) to present an Act which is simple, effective, and acceptable to persons
desiring to execute a declaration and to physicians and health-care facilities
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time of this writing, ten states have enacted living will legislation
that is based on significant portions of the Uniform Act.9 1
The scope of the Uniform Act is narrow. The Uniform Act
provides that there is no presumption of an individual's wishes for
or against life prolonging treatment where death is imminent,
unless that individual has actually written a declaration pursuant
to the Act.92 Additionally, the provisions of the Uniform Act are
limited to treatment which is life prolonging, and then, only for
patients whose condition is terminal or irreversible.9"
A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LIVING
WILL ACT
The legislative intent of the North Dakota Living Will Act is
found in North Dakota Century Code section 23-06.4-01.14 Sec-
tion 23-06.4-01 provides generally, that it is the intent of the act to
provide competent adults with the right to control decisions relat-
whose conduct will be affected, (2) to provide for the effectiveness of a
declaration in states other than the state in which it is executed through
uniformity of scope and procedure, and (3) to avoid the inconsistency in
approach which has characterized the early statutes.
Id.
91. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, §§ 1-18, 9B U.L.A. 82 (Supp. 1990).
The ten states which have written living will statutes relying on portions of the Uniform Act
include Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to -.100 (1986)); Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN
§§ 20-17-201 to -218, (1987 & Supp. 1989)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-1 to -27 (Supp.
1989)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.1 to .11 (West 1989)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 2921 to 2931 (Supp. 1989)); Maryland (MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-601 to
614 (1990)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010 to .055 (Vernon's Supp. 1990)); Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-9-101 to 206 (1989)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01
to -14 (Supp. 1989)); and Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101 to 3111 (West Supp.
1990)).
92. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987). See also In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987). Gardner involved an action to discontinue life-
sustaining procedures on a hospital patient in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 949.
Joseph Gardner had been in a coma for two years following an automobile accident. Id. He
had not written a living will prior to his accident. Id. at 952. In its decision, the Maine
Supreme Court recognized Maine's recently enacted living will legislation, but found it not
relevant to the case at bar. Id. at 952 n.3. The court did note that "It]he legislature,
however, expressly provided that the Act creates no presumption concerning the intention
of a person who does not have a document that qualifies as a 'living will'...." Id.
93. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987).
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (Supp. 1989). Section 23-06.4-01, entitled
Legislative intent provides:
Every competent adult has the right and the responsibility to control the
decisions relating to the adult's own medical care, including the decision to have
medical or surgical means or procedures calculated to prolong the adult's life
provided, withheld, or withdrawn. Communication about such matters is
encouraged between each person and the person's family, the physician, and
other health care providers. This chapter does not condone, authorize, approve,
or permit mercy killing, euthanasia, or assisted suicide or permit any affirmative
or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process
of dying.
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ing to their medical care, including the decision to have medical
procedures withheld or withdrawn.95 Section 23-06.4-01 goes on
to state that it is not the intent of the Act to condone mercy killing,
euthanasia or assisted suicide.96 This intent is consistent with the
Constitutional right to privacy, the Fourteenth Amendment lib-
erty interest identified in Cruzan,9 and the common-law right to
decline life sustaining medical treatment.9" The legislative intent
of the North Dakota Living Will Act clearly indicates that the right
to self-determination is not absolute, and must be balanced with
the conflicting state interest against euthanasia, mercy killing or
assisted suicide.99 The right set forth in the North Dakota Living
Will Act permitting "the natural process of dying" is based on an
individual's right to self-determination, and the desire to be free
from judicial intervention, rather than a specific intent to die.'00
Thus, the refusal of medical treatment or the removal of life sup-
port systems, allowing natural death to occur, is distinguished from
an affirmative act hastening the advent of death.'0 '
B. TERMS DEFINED IN THE NORTH DAKOTA LIVING WILL
ACT
North Dakota's Living Will Act defines key terms which are
used in the statute.'0 2 Although the North Dakota Living Will Act
95. Id.
96. id.
97. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990) (the Cruzan
Court noted that after Quinlan most right to die decisions were based on both a common
law right and a constitutional right to privacy. Cruzan identified a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest in unwanted medical decisions as an additional consideration when
evaluating an individual's right to die).
98. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (Supp. 1989). The legislative intent states that
every competent adult has the right and responsibility to make decisions regarding health
care. Id. Similarly, the Belchertown court discussing the common law right to die
precedent noted: "We take the view that the substantive rights of the competent and
incompetent person are the same in regard to the right to decline potentially life-
prolonging treatment." Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, -'
370 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1977).
99. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (Supp. 1989).
100. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4 (Supp. 1989).
101. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 162 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1978);
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n. 1
(1986); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp. Inc., 398 Mass. 417, - n.29, 497 N.E.2d 626,
635 n.29 (1986); In re Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983); In re Conroy, 98
NJ. 321, -, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985).
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02 (Supp. 1989). The text of § 23-06.4-02 provides:
Definitions. In this chapter, unless context otherwise requires:
1. "Attending physician" means the physician who has primary responsibility
for the treatment and care of the patient.
2. "Declaration" means a writing executed in accordance with the
requirements of subsection 1 of section 23-06.4-03.
3. "Health care provider" means a person who is licensed, certified, or
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is based on the Uniform Act, some of the key terms have been
changed to reflect the intent given the statute by the North
Dakota legislature.10 3 The terms defined by the Living Will Act
include "declaration," "life-prolonging treatment (termed life-sus-
taining treatment under the Uniform Act)," "qualified patient"
and "terminal condition.' 0 4
1. The Definition of "Declaration"
The term "declaration" is defined in the North Dakota Living
Will Act as an actual physical writing, in the manner set forth in
section 23-06.4-03 of the statute. 10 5 Subsections (a) and (b) of Sec-
tion 23-06.4-03(3) provide the form which the declaration must
take when requesting the provision, withholding, or withdrawal of
life prolonging procedures when death is imminent. 10 6 The stat-
ute requires that the form set out in the statute must be "substan-
tially" followed if a declaration is to be given effect.'0 7 The
statute's requirement that the declaration "substantially" follow
the form set out in the statute could indicate that a terminally ill
otherwise authorized by the law of this state to administer health care in the
ordinary course of business or practice of a profession.
4. "Life-prolonging treatment" means any medical procedure, treatment, or
intervention that, when administered to a qualified patient, will serve only to
prolong the process of dying and where, in the judgment of the attending
physician, death will occur whether or not the treatment is utilized. The term
does not include the provision of appropriate nutrition and hydration or the
performance of any medical procedure necessary to provide comfort, care, or
alleviate pain.
5. "Physician" means an individual licensed to practice medicine in this state
pursuant to chapter 43-17.
6. "Qualified patient" means a patient eighteen or more years of age who has
executed a declaration and who has been determined by the attending physician
and other physician who has personally examined the patient to be in a terminal
condition.
7. "Terminal condition" means an incurable or irreversible condition that,
without the administration of life-prolonging treatment, will result, in the
opinion of the attending physician, in imminent death. The term does not
include any form of senility, Alzheimer's disease, mental retardation, mental
illness, or chronic mental or physical impairment, including comatose conditions
that will not result in imminent death.
Id.
103. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02 (Supp. 1989) with UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE
TERMINALLY ILL AcT, 9B U.L.A. 611-12 (1987).
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02 (Supp. 1989). Section 23-06.4-02 also defines the
terms "Attending physician," "Health care provider," and "Physician." Id. (statutory
definitions of these terms comport closely with meanings commonly recognized by the
courts, and it is unlikely that the statutory definition of these terms will have any effect on
developed case law).
105. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(2) (Supp. 1989). For the text of Section 23-06.4-
02.2. See supra note 102.
106. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(3Xa) and (bXSupp. 1989). For the text of Section
23-06.4-03. See infra notes 144.
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(3Xa) and (b) (Supp. 1989).
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individual who puts their preference for the use or withdrawal of
life prolonging measures into a writing of their own words could
have the declaration declared ineffective. 10
All forty-one states which have enacted living wills legislation
require a written document, although the requirements for a valid
declaration vary from state to state.'0 9 The Uniform Act provides
a sample declaration form but states that the declaration "may, but
need not," be in the form provided." 0 Thus, although North
Dakota has based its act on the Uniform Act, and followed the
majority of states in requiring that the declarations be in writing,
the legislature may have significantly narrowed the definition of a
declaration by requiring that the statutory format be substantially
followed.' 11
2. The Definition of a "'Qualified Patient"
The North Dakota Living Will Act provides that a "qualified
patient may make decisions regarding life-prolonging treatment as
long as the patient is competent."' 1 2 To be a "qualified patient" in
terms defined by the North Dakota Living Will Act, three ele-
ments must be met: First, the patient must be at least eighteen
years of age; second, the patient must have executed a declaration,
or living will; and third, the patient must have been diagnosed as
terminally ill by two physicians." 3
The first and second elements required of a qualified patient
are relatively self-explanatory, the first requiring that the individ-
ual have reached the age of majority, and the second requiring
108. Id.
109. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS (1987).
Each of the states which has enacted a living will statute contains the requirement of an
actual physical writing. Id. at "Checklist Chart of Living Will Laws" (Supp. 1987). Of these
states, three have provisions allowing an oral declaration to be valid under special
circumstances. Id. Florida's living will law permits oral declarations of a living will only if a
declarant is unable to sign and a witness signs for and at the direction of the declaration.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.01 (1986). In Louisiana, the living will statute allows an oral or
nonverbal declaration to be valid, but the physician must note the declaration in the
declarant's medical record, and state the reasons for the giving of an oral, rather than a
written declaration. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.58.3 (West Supp. 1990). Virginia's
living will statute allows an oral declaration if made in the presence of two witnesses and a
physician, after the diagnosis of a terminal condition. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983 (1988).
110. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 614 (1987). The
official comments to section two of the Uniform Act state that the declaration form is not
mandatory. Id. A detailed declaration form was rejected by the drafters for two reasons.
First, the drafters did not want to place an elaborate form in the Uniform Act, out of
concern that a more simple form would be considered inadequate; second, the drafters
attempted to word the declaration in a simple and concise manner, to provide notice to
declarants of exactly what would happen should the living will become effective. Id.
111. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(3) (Supp. 1989).
112. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07(1) (Supp. 1989).
113. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(6) (Supp. 1989).
1990]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
that the individual have executed a living will substantially follow-
ing the form set forth in Section 23-06.4-03.14 The third element
required of a qualified patient is that two physicians agree that the
patient's illness meets the definition of "terminal condition" set
forth in the Living Will Act." 5 Each of these three elements must
be present before a person is considered a "qualified patient" such
that the statute is applicable to that person. 1 6
The North Dakota Living Will Act in section 23-06.4-07(4),
removes from the definition of a "qualified patient," any declarant
who is pregnant unless it is determined that the medical treat-
ment would be harmful to the declarant or the fetus, or unreasona-
bly painful. 1 7 One of the major concerns addressed during the
drafting of the North Dakota Living Will Act was the effect of an
otherwise valid declaration where the declarant later becomes
pregnant." 8 The express directive limiting the circumstances
where a pregnant declarant may be considered a "qualified
patient" allows the continuing development of a fetus, if at all pos-
sible and is consistent with the common law rights of innocent
third parties." 9 The North Dakota Living Will Act specifically
requires that treatment must be provided to a pregnant declarant
unless both the physician and an obstetrician decide that treat-
ment will not maintain the patient so as to all the further develop-
ment and birth of the fetus, or be harmful or unreasonably painful
to the expectant mother.' 20
114. Id.
115. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(7) (Supp. 1989).
116. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-04 (Supp. 1989). The third element of the definition
of a "qualified patient" requires determination by the attending physician and a second
physician that the declarant is terminally ill. Id. Prior to the living will becoming
operative, all three elements of the definition of a "qualified patient" must occur. Id.
117. The treatment of the pregnant declarant, as well as the management of the
qualified patient is found in Section 23-06.4-07 of the North Dakota Living Will Act.
118. The Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill Act: Hearings on H.B. 1481 Before House
Comm. on Human Ser. and Vet. Affairs, 51st N.D. Legislative Session (Feb. 3, 1989).
Testimony from both the North Dakota Catholic Conference and North Dakota Right-to-
Life Committee indicated that support by these groups for the living will bill was
contingent on the declaration being invalid during pregnancy. Id.
119. Cf. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, _, 201
A.2d 537, 538 (1964). Raleigh is one of the earlier common law right to self-determination
decisions which recognize the rights of innocent third persons. Id. at __, 201 A.2d at 537-
38. In Anderson, the defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, was 32 weeks pregnant. Id. at __, 201
A.2d at 537. She required blood transfusions and had refused them based on religious
beliefs, jeopardizing the life of her infant. Id. at -, 201 A.2d at 537-38. The court held that
she could not refuse blood transfusions for religious reasons if it was determined that
transfusions were necessary to save her life or the life or her child. Id. at __, 201 A.2d at
538.
120. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-7(04) (Supp. 1989). When death is imminent for a
pregnant woman, the physician has an affirmative duty to provide medical treatment to the
woman to save a viable fetus. Id. Although it is not indicated either in the legislative
history of the living will statute or within the statute itself, there is a presumption that a
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3. Definition of "'Life-Prolonging Treatment"
The definition of "life-prolonging treatment" in the North
Dakota Living Will Act provides:
"Life-prolonging treatment" means any medical proce-
dure, treatment, or intervention that, when administered
to a qualified patient, will serve only to prolong the pro-
cess of dying and where, in the judgment of the attending
physician, death will occur whether or not the treatment
is utilized. The term does not include the provision of
appropriate nutrition or hydration or the performance of
any medical procedure necessary to provide comfort,
care, or alleviate pain. 1 2
1
This definition of life-prolonging treatment is more easily
understood when read as two separate parts. The first part of the
definition is "any medical procedure, treatment, or interven-
tion. ' 122 A life-prolonging medical treatment could be inter-
preted to include anything ordered by a physician, with the
exception of nutrition, hydration, or comfort care, which are spe-
cifically excluded from the definition.123
The provision, withdrawal or removal of medical treatment
can only apply to a "qualified patient" as defined in Section 23-
06.4-02(6).124 Further, the medical treatment is considered life-
prolonging when it serves to "prolong the process of dying and
where ... death will occur whether or not the treatment is uti-
lized.' 2 ' Although both the Uniform Act and the North Dakota
Living Will Act rely on the physician to make the final determina-
tion as to when the process of dying is being prolonged by medical
treatment, the North Dakota Living Will Act contains the clause
''where death will occur whether or not the treatment is utilized"
which the Uniform Act does not.' 26 North Dakota chose to use
this language as an additional limitation on the circumstances
declaration requesting the use of life prolonging procedures is valid during pregnancy.
Telephone interview with Rep. Judy DeMers, prime sponsor of House Bill 1481 (March 6,
1990). Only those declarations which request the withdrawal or withholding of life
prolonging procedures are invalid.
121. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(04) (1989).
122. Id.
123. Id. Nutrition, hydration and comfort care are addressed specifically in section 23-
06.4-07 of North Dakota's Living Will Act.
124. For a discussion of section 23-06.4-02, see supra notes 102-04 and accompanying
text.
125. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(4) (Supp. 1989).
126. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(04) (Supp. 1989) with UNIF. RIGHTS OF
THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT § 1(04), 9B U.L.A. 611 (1987).
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where the declaration would be applicable. 127 Thus, the North
Dakota Living Will Act does not address the withholding of medi-
cal treatment even with the existence of a valid declaration where
death is not imminent.128
The second part of the North Dakota Living Will Act defini-
tion of life-prolonging treatment specifically excludes nutrition,
hydration, and relief from pain from the definition of life-prolong-
ing medical procedures. 129 In this regard, the North Dakota Liv-
ing Will Act again differs from the Uniform Act's definition of life
prolonging procedures. 130  The Uniform Act's definition of life-
prolonging treatment is silent about whether nutrition or hydra-
tion are to be considered life-prolonging.13 ' The North Dakota
legislature has purposely chosen to exclude nutrition, hydration,
and comfort care from the definition of "life prolonging treat-
ment" because of concerns about viewing nutrition, hydration and
comfort care as medical treatments.132 However, nutrition, hydra-
tion, and comfort care are specifically addressed in North Dakota's
Living Will Act. 133
127. The Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill Act: Hearings on H.B. 1481 Before the
House Comm. on Human Serv. and Vet. Affairs, 51st N.D. Legislative Session (Feb. 3, 1989)
(although initially opposed to the living will legislation, both the Catholic Conference and
North Dakota Right to Life supported the bill based on the limiting language added to the
Uniform Act's definition of "life-sustaining treatment").
128. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-02, -04 (Supp. 1989).
129. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(4) (Supp. 1989). Nutrition and hydration were
omitted from the definition of medical treatment at the request of the North Dakota
Catholic Conference, which has taken a stand against classifying nutrition and hydration as
medical treatment. Testimony by Representative Judy DeMers, prime sponsor of North
Dakota's living will. By request of the Catholic Conference, both nutrition and hydration as
extraordinary measures are addressed in Section 23-06.4-07 of North Dakota's Living Will
Act. Id.
130. Compare Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act § 1(04), 9B U.L.A. 611 (1987)
with N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02 (Supp. 1989).
131. The question of whether nutrition and hydration are to be considered medical
treatment has been debated in both the legal and medical arenas over the last twenty years,
prompting the American Medical Association to define its position in a formal statement.
Statement of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association,
March 15, 1986. The American Medical Association expressed concern with a growing
uneasiness of physicians regarding the withholding of nutrition and hydration to terminally
ill patients. Id. The statement defines nutrition and hydration as life prolonging treatment,
and ask physicians dealing with terminally ill patients to weigh the benefits of nutrition and
hydration against the burdens to the patient. Id. The Cruzan Court does not differentiate
artificially administered nutrition and hydration from other forms of medical treatment.
See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990). Justice
O'Connor states that "artificial feeding cannot be readily distinguished from other forms of
medical treatment." Id. at 2857 (O'Connor J., concurring).
132. The Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill Act: Hearings on H.B. 1481 Before the
House Comm. on Human Serv. and Vet. Affairs, 51st N.D. Legislative Session (Feb. 3, 1989)
(the North Dakota Catholic Conference indicated that its support was dependent upon
nutrition and hydration being excluded from the definition of "medical treatment").
133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07(3) (Supp. 1989).
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4. The Definition of "Terminal Condition"
As with the definition of "life-prolonging treatment," the defi-
nition of "terminal condition" is more easily understood when
read in separate parts.1 34 The first part of the definition is an
affirmative statement that a terminal condition is "an incurable or
irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-pro-
longing treatment, will result .. .in imminent death."13 Thus,
"terminal condition," as defined in the North Dakota Living Will
Act, is limited to circumstances in which a patient's condition is
incurable or irreversible, and when death is imminent. 136  Con-
versely, a medical condition which is not incurable or irreversible,
or when death is not imminent, is not a "terminal condition" as
defined by the North Dakota Living Will Act.137
The second part of the definition of "terminal condition"
excepts the illnesses or conditions which may be incurable or irre-
versible, but for which death is not clearly imminent.' 38 This
wording is consistent with the intent of the North Dakota Legisla-
134. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(1) (Supp. 1989). For the text of section 23-06.4-02.
See supra note 102.
135. Id.
136. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07(3) (Supp. 1989). The official comments from
the Uniform Act, which is the basis for North Dakota's Living Will Act offer some indication
of the difficulty in attempting to limit the definition of "terminal condition." The official
comment to section one of the Uniform Act states:
The difficulty of trying to express such a [terminal] condition in precise, accurate,
but not unduly restricting language is obvious. A definition must preserve the
physicians' professional discretion in making such determinations.
Consequently, the Act's definition of terminal condition incorporates not only
selected language from various state acts, but also suggestions from medical
literature in the field .... A number of states' statutes now use "incurable"
and/or "irreversible," and the terms appear to comport with the criteria applied
by physicians in terminal care situations. The phrase "incurable or irreversible"
is to be read conjunctively when the circumstances warrant. A condition which
is reversible but incurable is not a terminal condition.
UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT § 1, 9B U.L.A. 612-13 comment (1987). While
the comments of the drafters of the Uniform Act are not necessarily indicative of the intent
of the North Dakota Legislature, absent legislative history to the contrary, they are at least
some evidence of the intent of the North Dakota Legislature. Cf. Farmers Union Cent.
Exch. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 675 F. Supp. 1534, 1537 (D.N.D. 1987).
137. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(7) (Supp. 1989). Although North Dakota has
not provided a statutory definition of imminent death, other courts have tried to define this
concept. See State Dept. of Human Serv. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1978). The Tennessee Court of Appeals found that death was imminent if death would
occur sometime during a patient's hospital stay, though not necessarily immediately. Id. at
205, 209. See also 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 7 (Md. 1988Xciting Hazelton v. Powhatan Nursing
Home, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 414 (Cir. Ct. Fairfax Cty. 1986)). In Hazelton, a Virginia trial court
suggested that the term "imminent" death might be applicable to a person within a few
months of death, as opposed to a person with only a few hours to live. Id.
138. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(7) (Supp. 1989). The definition of terminal
condition in North Dakota's Living Will Act specifically excepts "any form of senility,
Alzheimer's disease, mental retardation, mental illness, or chronic mental or physical
impairment, including comatose conditions" which are incurable or irreversible but not
terminal. Id.
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ture to exclude those conditions that are neither curable nor
reversible, but are not considered terminal conditions.'39
There are a number of decisions which have allowed life-pro-
longing treatment to be discontinued where the individual was in
an irreversible, persistive vegetative state but death was not immi-
nent.140 However, such decisions could not be based on the North
Dakota Living Will Act because the definition of "terminal condi-
tion" specifically limits the scope of the Act to individuals who are
very near death, with or without life-prolonging procedures.' 4 1
C. DECLARATIONS RELATING TO THE USE OF LIFE-
PROLONGING PROCEDURES
North Dakota's Living Will Act sets forth the elements which
must be present in order for a person to have the capacity to exe-
cute a living will.' 42 These elements include that the declarant: 1)
139. The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act: Hearings on H.B. 1481 Before the
Sen. Comm. on Human Serv. and Vet. Affairs, 51st N.D. Legislative Session (March 3,
1989Xstatement of Rep. Judy DeMers, primary sponsor of H.B. 1481). Rep. DeMers
testified that the intent of the North Dakota Living Will Act is to clearly exclude certain
conditions from the definition of terminal condition. Id. The conditions which are
excluded include illnesses which are incurable or irreversible, but where death is not
imminent. Id. Specifically, this would exclude individuals diagnosed with Alzheimer's
disease or other similar incurable diseases, unless the disease had progressed to the point
where death was imminent. Id.
In this regard, it is important to note that the stated legislative intent of the North
Dakota Living Will is to allow the natural process of dying to occur. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-
06.4-01 (Supp. 1989). Any affirmative or deliberate acts intended to hasten the process of
dying are not allowed or condoned by the North Dakota Act. Id. Death must, therefore, be
imminent before the provisions of North Dakota's living will may apply.
140. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987),
rehearing Dec. 11, 1987; Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc. 398 Mass. 417, 497
N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Colyer, 99 Wash,2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64,438 N.Y.S. 266 (1981); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207,741
P.2d 674 (1987); John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re
Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
141. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(7) (Supp. 1989). In 1987 the Burleigh County
court decided In re Bayer. In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct., Feb. 5, 1987),
rehearing Dec. 11, 1987. Mrs. Bayer was in an irreversible, incurable persistent vegetative
state, but her death was not imminent as long as she received artificial nutrition and
hydration. Id. at 3-4. In Bayer, the court determined that the applicable common law
doctrines allowed the Court to grant an order to remove artificial means of nutrition and
hydration. Id. at 19-20. The scope of the North Dakota Living Will Act may have
precluded a similar holding based on the Act. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(4) (1989).
However, the court may have been able to reach its conclusion if it found section 23-06.4-
07(03) of the Act applicable. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07(03X1989). Section 23-06.4-
07(03) of the Living Will Act allows a physician to withhold nutrition and hydration where it
cannot be physically assimilated or is unreasonably painful or burdensome to the patient.
Id. Although the statute has not yet been tested, this section of the living will might have
provided a means for the Bayer court to allow nutrition and hydration to be withheld from
Mrs. Bayer.
142. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (Supp. 1989). Section 23-06.4-03(1), titled
Declarations relating to use of life-prolonging treatment, provides:
1. An individual of sound mind and eighteen or more years of age may execute
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be of sound mind; 2) be over the age of eighteen; and 3) sign the
declaration or have another sign it at the declarant's direction and
in the presence of two valid witnesses. 143 Additionally, the North
Dakota Living Will Act sets forth the specific forms a valid living
will declaration must take, and provides that these forms must be
substantially followed if the declaration is to be valid.1 44
at any time a declaration governing the use, withholding, or withdrawal of
life-prolonging treatment. The declaration must be signed by the declarant,
or another at the declarant's direction, and witnessed by two individuals who
are not:
a. Related by blood or marriage;
b. Entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant under any will of the
declarant or codicil to will existing by operation of law or otherwise, at the
time of the declaration;
c. Claimants against any portion of the estate of the declarant at the time of
the execution of the declaration;
d. Directly financially responsible for the declarant's medical care;
e. Attending physicians of the declarant.
Id.
143. See id.
144. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(3) (Supp. 1989). Section 23-06.4-03(3) states:
A declaration must be substantially in the form set forth in subdivision a or b, as
applicable, but the declaration may include additional specific directives. The
invalidity of any additional specific directives does not affect the validity of the
declaration.
a. A declaration to withdraw or withhold life-prolonging treatment must be
substantially in the following form:
Declaration made this - day of __ (month, year).
I, - , being at least eighteen years of age and of sound mind, willfully and volunta-
rily make known my desire that my life must not be artificially prolonged under the circum-
stances set forth below, and do hereby declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable condition caused by injury, disease,
or illness certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians, and where the
application of life-prolonging treatment would serve only to artificially prolong
the process of my dying and my attending physician determines that my death is
imminent whether or not life-prolonging treatment is utilized, I direct that such
treatment be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such life-
prolonging treatment, it is my intention that this declaration be honored by my
family and physicians as the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical
or surgical treatment and accept the consequences of that refusal, which is
death.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and the diagnosis is known to my physi-
cian, this declaration is not effective during the course of my pregnancy.
4. I understand the full import of this declaration and I am emotionally and
mentally competent to make this declaration.
5. I understand that I may revoke this declaration at any time.
Signed
City, County and State of Residence
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe the declarant to be of
sound mind. I am not related to the declarant by blood or marriage, nor would I be entitled
to any portion of the declarant's estate upon the declarant's death. I am not the declarant's
attending physician, a person who has a claim against any portion of the declarant's estate
upon the declarant's death, or a person directly financially responsible for the declarant's
medical care.
Witness
Witness
b. A declaration to direct the use of life-prolonging treatment must be substantially in the
following form:
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If the declarant resides in a long term care facility, the Act
requires that one of the witnesses be an ombudsman.145  This
requirement that one witness to the declaration be an ombudsman
reflects a growing awareness of the vulnerability of aged persons
in nursing homes.'14  This awareness is also reflected in the grow-
ing body of common law decisions addressing right to die issues. 147
Declaration made this - day of - (month, year). I, , being at least eight-
een years of age and of sound mind, willfully and voluntarily make known my desire to
extend my desire to extend my life under the circumstances set forth below, and do hereby
declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable condition caused by injury, disease,
or illness certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians, I direct the use
of life-prolonging treatment that could extend my life.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such life-
prolonging treatment, it is my intention that this declaration be honored by my
family and physicians as the final expression of my legal right to direct medical
and surgical treatment and accept the consequences of that directive.
3. I understand the full import of this declaration and I am emotionally and
mentally competent to make this declaration.
4. I understand that I may revoke this declaration at any time.
Signed
City, County and State of Residence
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe the declarant to be of
sound mind. I am not related to the declarant by blood or marriage, nor would I be entitled
to any portion of the declarant's estate upon the declarant's death. I am not the declarant's
attending physician, a person who has a claim against any portion of the declarant's estate
upon the declarant's death, or a person directly financially responsible for the declarant's
medical care.
4. A physician or other health care provider who is furnished a copy of the
declaration shall make it a part of the declarant's medical record and, if unwill-
ing to comply with the declaration, promptly so advise the declarant.
Id.
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(2) (Supp. 1989). Section 23-06.4-03(2) provides:
If the declarant is a resident of a long-term care facility, as defined in section 50-
10.1-01, at the time the declaration is executed, one of the two witnesses to the
declaration must be a regional long-term care ombudsman as provided in section
50-10.1-02.
Id. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-10.1-02 (Supp. 1989). Section 50-10.1-02 defines the resident of
a long-term care facility, as a "person residing in and receiving personal care from a long-
term care facility." Id. Pursuant to the statute, the long term care Ombudsman is responsi-
ble for investigating and monitoring complaints about administrative actions that affect
long-term care residents, monitoring federal, state and local laws that affect long-term care
residents, providing information to the public about the problems of long-term care resi-
dents, training volunteers to assist in the ombudsman programs, and act as advocate for
long-term care residents. Id.
146. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-10.1 (1989) (requiring the establishment of an
ombudsman to monitor long term care facilities on behalf of the elderly).
147. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, __, 486 A.2d 1209, 1239 (1985). Two years after
Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re Peter, 108 N.J. 364, 529 A.2d 419
(1987). In Peter, one Mr. Johanning petitioned the court to seek appointment as Hilda
Peter's guardian. Id. at -, 529 A.2d at 422. Hilda had been in a persistent vegetative state
for one year being sustained by a nasogastric tube. Id. Discussing the purposes of the
Ombudsman, the court stated that:
"The Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly is involved in this case
... to guard against abuse of elderly nursing home patients. Because of the
particularly vulnerable nature of elderly incompetent patients in nursing homes,
the Ombudsman must scrutinize all decisions to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining medical treatment from them."
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D. THE FORM OF THE DECLARATION
Although the North Dakota Living Will Act requires the dec-
laration to substantially follow the form set out in Section 23-06.4-
03(3), additional specific directives may also be included. 14  Thus,
although North Dakota's Living Will Act requires a specific form
be used, the statute also allows for additions or personalization of
the declaration by the declarant. 14
9
Of the forty-one states that have drafted and passed "living
will" legislation prior to North Dakota's Act, all but two states, Cal-
ifornia and Oregon, allow residents to "personalize" their living
will declaration. 15 0 In some states, this includes naming a proxy or
attorney-in-fact who is authorized to act on behalf of, or in place of
the declarant.' 5 ' This authorization is consistent with the com-
mon-law doctrines of "substituted judgment" and "informed con-
sent."' 2 Although North Dakota's Living Will Act does not
specifically authorize the naming of a proxy or an attorney-in-fact
within the statute, naming a proxy or attorney-in-fact may be an
acceptable way to personalize a declaration.' 5 3
E. SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT, INFORMED CONSENT, AND
NORTH DAKOTA'S LIVING WILL
North Dakota's living will allows additional specific directives
to be included in the declaration form.' 54 Whether it is possible to
write an effective living will naming a substitute decision maker as
an additional safeguard for the right to informed consent about a
Id. at -, 529 A.2d at 423 (footnote and citation omitted).
148. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (Supp. 1989) with UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE
TERMINALLY ILL Acr § 2, 9B U.L.A. 614 (1987) (Uniform Act states that the statutory
declaration form may be followed. North Dakota chose to provide a statutory form which
must be substantially followed, but does allow additional specific directives).
149. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(3) (Supp. 1989).
150. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAws 9 (1987 ed.).
Thirty-seven out of thirty-nine state statutes in existence prior to the enactment of North
Dakota's Act allowed a provision for personalizing the living will declaration, and
presumably this could include naming a proxy, agent or attorney-in-fact. Id. at "Checklist
Chart of Living Will Laws" (Supp. 1987).
151. Id. at 9-10. Thirteen states specifically allow the naming of a proxy within the
declaration. These include Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 9. In addition to these states,
California and Rhode Island have a separate durable power of attorney statute for medical
decisions which effectively allow the holder of the power to make medical decisions in the
event of the principal's incapacity. Id. at 9-10.
152. For a further discussion of the doctrines of substituted judgment and informed
consent, see supra notes 41-79 and accompanying text.
153. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(3) (Supp. 1989) (allowing additional specific
directives to be included in a declaration). For the relevant text of section 23-06.4-03, see
supra notes 142, 144, and 145.
154. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(3) (Supp. 1989). For the relevant text of section
23-06.4-03(3), see supra note 144.
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specific medical procedure is an unanswered question at the pres-
ent time.1 55
With regard to the right of a substituted decision maker to
make medical decisions regarding life prolonging treatment, a
developing precedent is being established through cases such as In
re Quinlan,156 In re Conroy,'5 7 In re Jobes,15 8 and North Dakota's
own In re Bayer.'5 9 These cases stand for a developing precedent
that an individual in an incurable, irreversible persistent vegeta-
tive state has certain protected privacy rights to refuse life-pro-
longing treatment through a substitute decision maker, whether
or not death is imminent. 160  In addition to the previously noted
cases, the United States Supreme Court's Cruzan decision and the
Florida District Court of Appeals' Corbett decision have recently
impacted the rights of surrogates in making medical treatment
decisions for an individual who is not competent. 16 1 In Cruzan,
the Supreme Court held that it is not unconstitutional for a state to
require "clear and convincing evidence" of the wishes of an
incompetent person prior to withdrawing life-sustaining treat-
ment from that person.'62 In 1986, the Florida District Court of
Appeals decided the right of a substituted decision maker to make
a determination about life prolonging treatment under Florida's
Living Will Act."6 3 In Corbett, the court addressed Florida's living
will statute which specifically excluded nutrition and hydration
155. Id. Section 23-06.4-03(3) of North Dakota's Living Will Act states that "the
declaration may include additional specific directives," but does not specifically authorize
the appointment of substitute decision makers. Id.
156. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
157. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
158. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
159. No. 4131, (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987).
160. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976Xallowing substituted
decision maker to decide the identity of treating physicians and to confer with those
physicians in treatment decisions); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d. 1209 (1985)
(surrogate decision makers may request withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures); In re
Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987Xsurrogate decision makers may refuse life-
prolonging procedures for a patient in a persistive vegetative state); In re Bayer, No. 4131
(N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) rehearing Dec. 11, 1987) (guardian's authorization
to request removal of artificial feeding for wife in irreversible vegetative state affirmed at
rehearing after physician refused to comply with initial order).
161. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990);
Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied 492 So. 2d
1331 (Fla. 1986).
162. Cruzan, 110 S.Ct. at 2854. At the time of this writing, the Cruzan decision is less
than a year old, and the scope of its impact has not yet been determined. It could be
argued, however, that in deciding right-to-withhold-treatment decisions for incompetent
persons, courts will require more than the "best interests" analysis. For a further discussion
of surrogate decision making using a "best interests" analysis, see supra notes 69-73 and
accompanying text.
163. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied 492
So.2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
520
RIGHT To DIE
from the list of life prolonging treatments that could be refused.' 6 4
Even with this restriction on the scope of the statute, the Corbett
court upheld a surrogate decision maker's right to order the
removal of a nasogastric tube.16 5 The Corbett court found that the
constitutional right to privacy provided an independent basis for
withdrawing the nasogastric tube, and that the living will statute
did not intend to limit existing common law and statutory
rights. 166
F. THE COMPETENCY OF THE DECLARANT AND WITNESSES
TO THE DECLARATION
To make a valid declaration under North Dakota's Living Will
Act, the declarant must attest to an understanding of the declara-
tion, and have the emotional and mental competence with which
to make this declaration. 6 The declarant must sign the declara-
tion or have it signed at her request.16 8  The signature must be
witnessed by at least two people. 169 The purpose of these wit-
nesses is to assure "that the declarant is mentally sound, of suffi-
cient maturity, and is not acting under duress or fraud at the time
of execution.' 70 Witnesses to the declaration must not be related
to the declarant either by blood or marriage, or be entitled to any
portion of the declarant's estate upon the declarant's death.
17 1
Additionally, the declarant's physician, or anyone financially
responsible for the declarant's medical care may not be a valid wit-
ness. 172 The North Dakota Living Will Act expands the witnessing
requirements found in the Uniform Act, yet provides no mecha-
164. Id. at 370. The Corbett court recognized that the Florida living will statute
provided an alternative means "whereby certain enumerated persons, together with the
attending physician, may act on behalf of an incompetent patient who has not made a
declaration in accordance with [the living will statute] when the express or implied intent
of the patient can be established." Id. But see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health 110
S.Ct. 2841 (1990) (U.S. Supreme Court upheld Missouri Supreme Court decision requiring
clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes prior to the withdrawal of life-
prolonging treatment).
165. Corbett, 487 So.2d at 370.
166. Id.
167. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (Supp. 1989). The need for the declarant to attest
to an understanding of the living will and the need for the mental and emotional
competence to make a declaration is consistent with the common law doctrine of informed
consent. For discussion of the requirements of the doctrine of informed consent, see supra
notes 41-79.
168. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(1) (Supp. 1989). For the relevant text of Section
23-06.4-03(1), see supra note 142.
169. Id.
170. Marzen, The "Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act-" A Critical Analysis, 1
ISSUES IN LAW AND MED. 441, 453 (1986).
171. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(1) (Supp, 1989). For the complete text of this
section, see supra note 142.
172. Id.
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nism to assure that those expanded requirements are met. 173
The purpose of the witness requirements is to add validity to
the declaration by having the witnesses certify that they believe
the declarant is of sound mind.174 However, like the Uniform Act,
the North Dakota Living Will Act contains no provision for deter-
mining the competency of the declarant at the time of declara-
tion.175 It is reasonable to assume that "many declarations will be
executed at or shortly after the time a patient has been diagnosed"
as terminally ill.176 This is a time when the declarant may be in
considerable emotional or psychological turmoil, physical pain,
and in a diminished mental capacity. 177 The legal sufficiency of a
living will could be in jeopardy if the competency of the declarant
is not determined accurately at the time the living will is
signed. ' 7 8
173. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(1) (Supp. 1989) with UNIF. RIGHTS OF
THE TERMINALLY ILL AcTr § 2, 9B U.L.A. 614 (1987). The Uniform Act does not require
witnesses to meet specific qualifications. Id. The comment to section two of the Uniform
Act notes that in the interest of simplicity the witnessing procedure should be as
uncomplicated as possible. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 614
comment (1987). In addition, the Uniform Act notes that the absence of a complicated
witness requirement relieves physicians of the very difficult burden of determining
whether the legalities of the witness requirements have been met. Id. Unlike the Uniform
Act, North Dakota's living will requires witnesses to meet statutory requirements.
174. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(3) (Supp. 1989). The North Dakota Living Will
Act provides statutory requirements for witnesses to verify the declarant's signature and
intent. Id. However, the living will contains no mechanism to assure that witnesses meet
the statutory witness requirements. See id. Without a mechanism to assure that the
witnesses meet the statutory requirements, the effect of the additional requirements could
be lessened because a doctor or court who has to determine whether a declaration is valid
may have no means to determine whether the declaration was validly witnessed.
175. The absence in the Uniform Act of a method of determining the competency of
the declarant has been critized. See Marzen, The "Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act"- A Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN LAW AND MED. 441, 454 (1986). Marzen notes that
the Uniform Act, upon which the North Dakota Living Will Act is based, provides little
assurance that the declarant is competent as:
... a lay witness might well believe that even a minor or mentally ill person
"voluntarily" signed a declaration, and there is no duty at all imposed upon the
witnesses to verify the majority, much less mental status of the declarant.
[The] [u]tter failure of the Act to provide a mechanism to assure the
competent mental status of the declarant at the time of execution is particularly
troubling.
Id. The drafters of the North Dakota Living Will Act apparently attempted to resolve this
difficulty by providing that witnesses meet additional requirements. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-06.4-03 (Supp. 1989). However, without a mechanism for enforcement of these addi-
tional requirements the legislature may have failed in this attempt.
176. Marzen, The "Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act". A Critical Analysis, 1
ISSUES IN LAW AND MED. 441, 454 (1986).
177. Id.
178. Id. The existence of a validly executed living will does not obligate the physician
to use, withhold or withdraw life prolonging procedures. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-
04 (Supp. 1989). This provision could allow a physician to refrain from acknowledging a
declaration where it is reasonable to believe that the declaration was made by a minor,
someone who lacked the capacity to make the declaration, or under conditions of duress.
See id.
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G. WHEN DOES THE LIVING WILL BECOME OPERATIVE?
North Dakota Century Code section 23-06.4-04 sets forth the
prerequisites for the North Dakota Living Will Act to become
operative. 179 One requirement for the declaration to be operative
is that the declaration must be communicated to the attending
physician.'8 0 The physician must then place the declaration in the
individual's medical records.'" The North Dakota Living Will Act
does not, however specify the method in which the declaration
must be communicated to the attending physician.'8 2  The
absence of a specific method of communicating with the physician
may create confusion and additional stress for both families and
health care providers at an otherwise stressful time.8 3 Whether
the physician must actually see the declaration, or whether notice
of the declaration may be communicated through other means are
questions left unanswered by the statute.' 8 4
Once the declaration is communicated to the attending physi-
cian and placed in the medical record of the individual, both the
attending physician and a second physician must determine that
the declarant is in a terminal condition and unable to make deci-
179. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-04 (Supp. 1989). Section 23-06.4-04 provides:
A declaration becomes operative when it is communicated to the attending
physician, and the declarant is determined by the attending physician and
another physician to be in a terminal condition and no longer able to make
decisions regarding administration of life-prolonging treatment. A declaration
made under section 23-06.4-03 does not obligate the physician to use, withhold,
or withdraw life-prolonging treatment but is presumptive evidence of the
declarant's desires concerning the use, withholding, or withdrawal of such
treatment and must be given great weight by the physician in determining the
intent of the incompetent declarant.
Id.
180. Id.
181. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-06 (Supp. 1989) (requiring the attending
physician who knows of a declaration of a terminally ill patient to record the declaration in
the patient's medical records).
182. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-04 (Supp. 1989) (requiring the declaration to be
communicated to the attending physician for the declaration to be operative).
183. Cf. Marzen, The "Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act ". A Critical Analysis,
1 ISSUES IN LAW AND MED. 441, 454 (1986). Marzen notes that many declarations will be
considered, and perhaps executed immediately following a terminal diagnosis. Id. This is
often a time of confusion and turmoil for both the patient and family. Id. Thus, clear
channels of communication are especially important at this time, and a lack of clarity in the
Uniform Act about how the physician should be informed could jeopardize the exercise of
the declaration.
184. Id. at 457. In communicating the existence of a living will declaration to the
physician, Marzen notes that under the wording of the Uniform Act, "a telephone call by a
mere acquaintance representing that such a document exists would seem to be sufficient."
Id. The North Dakota Living Will Act, like the Uniform Act, does not specify the manner in
which the declaration must be communicated to the physician. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-06.4-04 (Supp. 1989) with UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT § 3, 9B U.L.A.
615 (1987).
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sions for herself 85 When this has been done, the declaration
becomes operative.' 8 6
When a declaration becomes operative, the North Dakota Liv-
ing Will Act does not require the physician to initiate or withhold
life-prolonging measures pursuant to the statute.1 7 The operative
declaration is to be considered by the physician as "presumptive
evidence of the declarant's desires concerning the use, withhold-
ing, or withdrawal of such treatment."' 8 8 If, however, the attend-
ing physician is unwilling to comply with the declaration, the
statute requires the physician to transfer the patient as quickly as
possible to a physician who is willing to comply with the
declaration. 18 9
Although North Dakota's Living Will Act does not provide
any affirmative guidance for physicians who believe that a declara-
tion was made under conditions that would invalidate the opera-
tion of the living will,' 9 ° the Act does, however, allow the
physician the freedom to exercise professional judgment.' 9 ' Thus,
under the North Dakota Living Will Act, the physician could
refrain from action even after existence of the living will is com-
municated to the physician if there is reason to believe that the
declarant was a minor or lacking in the mental capacity to make a
185. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-04 (Supp. 1989).
186. See id.
187. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-04 (Supp. 1989). For the relevant text of section 23-
06.4-04, see supra note 179.
188. Id.
189. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-08 (Supp. 1989). Section 23-06.4-08 may
acknowledge the differing moral and ethical principles which exist between physicians and
allow a physician to graciously exit a situation which is contrary to his or her personal
ethical obligations toward a patient. Following the December 11, 1987 decision
authorizing the discontinuance of artificial nutrition and hydration, Mrs. lone Bayer's
physician reported to Mrs. Bayer's family that he had spent three sleepless nights, unable to
reconcile his personal beliefs as an individual with the court order. Telephone interview
with Ruth Sharp, Mrs. Bayer's daughter (May 11, 1990). Consequently, Mrs. Bayer
continued to be fed artificially until the family could locate a physician who would agree to
treat her in compliance with the court order. Id.
190. Cf. Marzen, The "Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act" A Critical Analysis
1 ISSUES IN LAW AND MED. 441, 457 (1986). Marzen notes that the problem of a physician
who believes that a declaration was not validly executed is not addressed in the Uniform
Act, stating:
[W]hat if the attending physician has reasonable cause to believe that the
declarant was a minor, was mentally unsound, or had acted under duress, fraud,
or undue influence at the time the declaration was executed? . .. There is no
exception in the Act that permits the physician to simply disregard these
obligations [to honor the declaration or transfer the patient] even in the face of
known evidence of irregularities at the time of execution.
Id. at 453, 457. The North Dakota Living Will Act, like the Uniform Act, fails to address this
problem. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-04 (Supp. 1989) with UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE
TERMINALLY ILL AcT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 615 (1987).
191. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-04 (Supp. 1989). For the relevant text of section
23-06.4-04, see supra note 179.
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valid declaration.1 92
The essential purpose of North Dakota's Living Will Act is to
provide the right to control decisions relating to one's own medi-
cal care, specifically where life-prolonging treatment is consid-
ered. 93 It seems inconsistent with the intent of the Act to provide
that the physician is not obligated to either provide, withhold or
withdraw life-prolonging procedures when a facially valid declara-
tion is present. 94 Allowing physicians discretion to enforce the
terms of a declaration may require them to become the ultimate
authority as to whether life-prolonging treatment will be pro-
vided, withheld, or withdrawn.195
A physician with questions about the validity of a declaration
may enlist the assistance, advice, or counsel of family members.1 9 6
The doctrine of substituted judgment, discussed in the majority of
right to die cases, states that the physician, informed family, and
loved ones who have the ability to make decisions for an individual
who is incompetent. 97 Substituted judgment could be an addi-
tional safeguard employed by a physician where the intent or cir-
cumstances surrounding the drafting of a declaration is
questioned.
H. REVOCATION OF A DECLARATION UNDER THE NORTH
DAKOTA LIVING WILL ACT
The North Dakota Living Will Act provides that a declaration
can be revoked at any time and in any manner if the declarant is
competent.' 98 The statute states that "revocation in any manner"
includes: 1) a dated writing, signed by the declarant; or 2) a physi-
cal cancellation or destruction by the declarant, or by another by
request and in the presence of the declarant or 3) the declarant
192. See id. A valid operative declaration under the North Dakota Living Will Act
does not require a physician to follow the directives in a living will, but is merely
"presumptive evidence of the declarant's desires concerning" medical treatment. Id.
193. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (Supp. 1989).
194. Id. See Marzen, The "Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act". A Critical
Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN LAW AND MED. 441, 444 (1986) (noting that allowing a physician
discretion to render a valid declaration inoperative is inconsistent with an intent to allow an
individual the right to control his or her own medical treatment).
195. Id.
196. Under the doctrine of substituted judgment, family members or others may have
the right to make medical decisions for an incompetent patient. See e.g., In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647, -. (1976). For a complete discussion of the doctrine of substituted
judgment, see supra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
197. For a further discussion of substituted judgment, see supra notes 46-68 and
accompanying text.
198. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-05 (Supp. 1989).
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may express an intent to revoke orally.199
Given the stress and emotion involved in a situation where an
individual is afflicted with a serious or terminal illness, it is not
unlikely that a declarant will experience periodic wavering in his
or her decision to have life prolonging procedures either provided,
withheld, or withdrawn. 0 0 The intent behind living will statutes
is to provide the means by which the right of self determination
may be exercised where death is imminent.20 ' Periodic vacillation
or a waiver of decision must be distinguished from a sincere oral
expression of the intent to revoke as provided in the statute.20 2
Given this distinction, it follows that the declaration of an individ-
ual who later waivers in the desire to abide by the declaration may
not automatically be voided because of temporary or fleeting
203wavering.
The revocation of a living will becomes operative when that
revocation is communicated to the physician or other health care
provider by the declarant or a witness to the revocation. 0 4 If the
health care provider is someone other than the physician, (for
example, a charge nurse) the health care provider may have an
199. Id. Section 23-06.4-05 provides:
1. A declaration may be revoked at any time and in any manner by the
declarant, provided the declarant is competent, including by:
a. A signed dated writing;
b. Physical cancellation or destruction of the declaration by the declarant or
another in the declarant's presence and at the declarant's direction; or
c. An oral expression of intent to revoke.
2. A revocation is effective upon communication to the attending physician or
other health care provider by the declarant or a witness to the revocation.
3. The attending physician or other health care provider shall make the
revocation a part of the declarant's medical record.
Id.
200. See Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Center, 163 Cal.App.3d 186, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (Cal.Ct.App. 1984). Mr. Bartling petitioned the court to have his ventilator
disconnected. Id. 189, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221. Mr. Bartling was aware that approval of his
request to disconnect his respirator would result in his death. Id. 191, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
From time to time, Mr. Bartling had occasionally wavered in his desire to be free of the
respirator. Id. 192, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223. In addressing the periodic wavering, the Bartling
court stated: "The fact that Mr. Bartling periodically wavered from this posture because of
severe depression or'for any other reason does not justify the conclusion.., that his capacity
to make such a decision was impaired .. ." Id. 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223-224.
201. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (Supp. 1989) (stating the intent of the North
Dakota Living Will Act is to provide individuals the means to control their own medical
decisions in the face of terminal illness).
202. Cf, Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, __, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (1978) (a
terminally ill patient who vacillates in the decision to refuse medical treatment where
death is inevitable does not justify the conclusion that the patient lacks the capacity to make
medical decisions).
203. Id. See also, Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Center, 163 Cal.App.3d 186,
209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223-224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (periodic wavering from the decision to
seek removal of a life sustaining respirator does not indicate the lack of capacity to make
medical decisions).
204. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-05(2) (Supp. 1989).
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implied duty to inform the physician of the revocation if informed
first. 20 5 As stated earlier, the Act requires either the physician or
the health care provider to make the revocation a part of the
declarant's medical record.20 6 During a medical emergency (such
as a cardiac arrest) where the patient's medical record may not be
consulted immediately or readily available, a reciprocal duty of
the health care provider and the physician to disclose the exist-
ence of a revocation could be an important safeguard. 20 7 The duty
to disclose the existence of a declaration would arise from the fact
that under emergency situations, the physician or health care pro-
vider with knowledge of the revocation may be the only one to
ensure that the revocation is honored. This duty is consistent with
the purposes of North Dakota's Living Will Act, which is to pro-
vide a vehicle for an individual's informed consent to be expressed
and followed regardless of competency. 208
I. COMFORT CARE AND PAIN RELIEF
Life-prolonging treatment notwithstanding, North Dakota's
Living Will Act does not alter the responsibility of physicians and
health care providers to ease the pain and suffering of the dying
patient.20 9 Recent cases addressing the right to die have recog-
nized that prevailing medical practice does not require that all
efforts be made to prolong the life of an individual.2 " It has long
been recognized that the dying are more often in need of comfort
than of treatment."' Unfortunately, the line between comfort
205. Id. Because North Dakota Living Will Act declaration is only operative where
death is imminent, an argument can be made that an implied duty to inform the physician
of the revocation exists. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(7) (Supp. 1987). If death is
imminent, time could be of the essence and steps to ensure that the revocation is
communicated to the physician would be crucial.
206. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-05(3) (Supp. 1989). Once a declarant revokes a living
will, the physician or health care provider must make it a part of the patient's medical
record. Id. In an emergency situation, if the physician is familiar with the patient's medical
history and condition, the medical record may be unavailable or not be consulted
immediately. A valid revocation to a living will could under those circumstances go
unnoticed by the physician. Id.
207. Cf. id.
208. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (Supp. 1989).
209. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07 (Supp. 1989). Section 23-06.4-07 provides: "This
chapter does not affect the responsibility of the attending physician or other health care
provider to provide treatment for a patient's comfort care or alleviation of pain." Id.
210. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647, 667, (1976).
211. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). In Satz, the
court addressed the distinction between providing treatment and providing comfort
noting:
Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception, demand that all
efforts toward life prolongation be made in all circumstances. Rather, as
indicated in Quinlan, the prevailing ethical practice seems to be to recognize
that the dying are more often in need of comfort than treatment. Recognition of
528 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:495
care and treatment is not always clearly drawn. In an effort to
clarify the distinction between comfort care and treatment, the
North Dakota Living Will Act specifically excludes comfort care
provided to ease the process of dying from the definition of "life
prolonging treatment.- 212
J. NUTRITION AND HYDRATION
North Dakota's Living Will Act does not affect the responsibil-
ity of the physician to provide nutrition or hydration except where
it cannot be physically assimilated, or is physically harmful. 213
Based on testimony from the North Dakota Catholic Conference,
nutrition and hydration are not considered medical treatment.214
In this respect, North Dakota's Living Will Act directly conflicts
with the prevailing attitude among physicians that life prolonging
medical treatment does include nutrition and hydration.21 5 North
the right to refuse necessary treatment in appropriate circumstances is
consistent with existing medical mores; such a doctrine does not threaten either
the integrity of the medical profession, the proper role of hospitals in caring for
such patients or the State's interest in protecting the same.
Id.
212. The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act: Hearings on H.B. 1481 before Sen.
Comm. on Human Serv. and Vet. Affairs, 51st N.D. Legislative Session (March 3,
1989Xstatement of Judy DeMers, prime sponsor of House Bill 1481). The North Dakota
Living Will Act was amended prior to its approval by the legislature to clarify the difference
between treatment which was life-prolonging and treatment that was comfort care
provided to an individual very close to death. Id. To distinguish the life-prolonging
treatment from the care provided to an individual whose death is imminent, nutrition,
hydration and comfort care were separated from the definition of life-prolonging
procedures. Id. Thus, under the North Dakota Living Will Act as enacted, nutrition,
hydration and comfort care are clearly not life prolonging treatment. See N.D. CENT. CODE§ 23-06.4-02(04) (Supp. 1989).
213. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07 (Supp. 1989). Section 23-06.4-07 provides in part:
This chapter does not affect the responsibility of the attending physician or
other health care provider to provide nutrition and hydration. Nutrition and
hydration may be withheld from a patient with a terminal condition if the
nutrition and hydration could not be physically assimilated by the patient or
would be physically harmful or unreasonably painful to the patient.
Id.
214. Id. The legislative history of Section 23-06.4 indicates that the provision
regarding nutrition and hydration was added as an accommodation to the North Dakota
Catholic Conference which indicated that it would not oppose the Act if nutrition and
hydration were removed from the definition of "medical treatment." The Uniform Rights
of the Terminally Ill Act: Hearings on H.B 1481 before the Sen. Comm. on Human Serv. and
Vet. Affairs, 51st N.D. Legislative Session (March 3, 1989) (testimony by Sr. Paula Ringuette,
North Dakota Catholic Conference).
215. Statement of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical
Association, March 15, 1986. The Statement of the Council provides, in part:
Life-prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially or
technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration. In treating a
terminally ill or irreversibly comatose patient, the physician should determine
whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its burdens. At all times, the dignity
of the patient should be maintained. (Emphasis added).
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Dakota's Living Will Act does, however, reflect the fact that it "is
hard to shed the emotional symbolism of food."1 6 Respecting the
"emotional symbolism" of the food in dealing with right to die
issues, the common-law has attempted to draw the distinction
between nutrition and hydration given as "ordinary care" as dis-
tinguished from nutrition and hydration given as "extraordinary
care." 217 Although no definitive test exists to differentiate "ordi-
nary" from "extraordinary" care, it can be said that the individ-
ual's total circumstances must be considered,2 18 and evaluated in
light of available life prolonging technology. 219 Additionally, aside
from the differences in whether nutrition and hydration is ordi-
nary care or extraordinary care, it must be noted that there are
circumstances where nutrition and hydration are actually harmful
to a terminally ill patient. 220  Nasogastric tubes, a very common
form of artificial feeding, may cause the incompetent patient
216. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, -, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985Xquoting Barber v.
Superior Ct., 147 Cal.App. 3d 1006, 1-16, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (1983)).
Once one enters the realm of complex, high technology medical care, it is
hard to shed the "emotional symbolism" of food. However, artificial feedings...
are medical procedures with inherent risks and possible side effects, instituted by
skilled healthcare providers to compensate for impaired physical functioning.
Id. (citation omitted).
217. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, _ 497 N.E.2d 626, 637
(1986). In assessing whether plaintiff Paul Brophy could have his artificial feeding tube
removed, the Brophy court looked at the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary
care. Id. In this regard the court noted that Mr. Brophy had received more than seven
hours of nursing care per day, he had no ability to care for himself in any way, and he had
been maintained by a nasogastric tube, which provided his nutrition and hydration. Id.
The court recognized that maintenance on a nasogastric tube might be considered ordinary
for a specific, defined period of time, but reasoned that "to state that the maintenance of
nutrition and hydration by the use of the existing... tube is only ordinary is to ignore the
total circumstances of Brophy's situation.., to be maintained by such artificial means over
an extended period of time is not only intrusive, it is extraordinary." Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. In addition to the question of whether a coma is reversible, it must be
acknowledged that the advent of new life-prolonging techniques might change what is
today considered an extraordinary measure, into one that is ordinary. Id. at -, 497 N.E.2d
at 637.
220. Telephone interview with Ruth Sharp, Mrs. lone Bayer's daughter (May 11, 1990)
(after the cuffed tracheostomy was inserted, Mrs. Bayer had continuous sores in and around
her mouth from being force fed several times a day). In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 372-374, -,
486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985) (quoting In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 99 (N.H. 1984) (Douglas, J.
dissenting)).
Furthermore, while nasogastric feeding and other medical procedures to ensure
nutrition and hydration are usually well tolerated, they are not free from risks or
burdens; they have complications that are sometimes serious and distressing to
the patient.
Id. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1236 (quoting Lo and Dornband Sounding Board, Guiding
the Hand That Feeds: Caring For The Demented Elderly, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 402,
403(1984)).
Nasogastric tubes may lead to pneumonia, cause irritation and discomfort, and
require arm restraints for an incompetent patient.
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greater discomfort than the inability to ingest food.22" ' Thus, while
issue of nutrition and hydration for the individual whose death is
imminent is an emotional one, it can neither be assumed that
nutrition will always be beneficial to a patient whose death is
imminent, nor always harmful when withheld.222
K. IMMUNITIES
The North Dakota Living Will Act provides that any person
who acts pursuant to the requirements of the living will chapter is
immune from criminal, civil, and disciplinary action.2 3 The scope
of immunity from liability is limited to non-grossly negligent
acts. 2 4 The North Dakota Living Will Act addresses liability in
section 23-06.4-11.221 Subsection (1) of section 23-06.4-11 states
that death occurring under this Act is neither homicide or sui-
cide.226 Similarly, the common law recognizes that a physician has
"no duty to continue treatment once it has been proved to be inef-
fective. ' 227  In some circumstances, after a specified length of
time, physicians consider the chances of recovery by an incompe-
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1236 (citing Lynn and Childress Must Patients Always Be Given Food And
Water 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 19-20 (1983); Paris & Fletcher, Infant Doe
Regulations and The Absolute Requirement To Use Nourishment and Fluids for the Dying
Infant, 11 LAW, MED. AND HEALTH CARE 210, 211-13 (1983). Dehydration may not be
painful or uncomfortable for a dying patient. Id. Where patients have lost the ability to
sense hunger or thirst, withholding of food which must be artificially forced upon the
individual may be no more painful than the termination of any other medical treatment.
Id. See generally The Right to Forego Medical Treatments, What Are the Legal Limits? 73
Op.Att'y Gen. 18 (Md. 1988) at -, n.22.
223. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-09 (Supp. 1989).
224. Id.
225. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-11 (Supp. 1989). Section 23-06.4-11 contains several
miscellaneous provisions regarding the North Dakota Living Will Act. Id.
Subsection (1) of section 23-06.4-11 provides:
1. Death resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging
treatment pursuant to a declaration and in accordance with this chapter does not
constitute, for any purpose, a suicide or homicide.
Id.
226. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-11(1) (Supp. 1989). Subsection 1 which provides that
death resulting from removal of life prolonging treatment is not homicide or suicide is in
accord with the common law. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Ct., 163 Cal.App.3d 186, 209
Cal. Rptr 220, 226 (Cal.Ct.App. 1984). The Conroy court noted:
Declining life-sustaining medical treatment may not properly be viewed as an
attempt to commit suicide. Refusing medical intervention merely allows the
disease to take its natural course; if death were eventually to occur, it would be
the result, primarily, of the underlying disease, and not the result of a self-
inflicted injury.
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, __, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985).
227. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983). The Barber court, addressing a physicians duty to continue medical treatment
noted:
A physician has no duty to continue treatment once it has proved to be
ineffective. Although there may be a duty to provide life-sustaining machinery in
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tent individual to be very doubtful. 228 Section 23-06.4-11 of North
Dakota's Living Will Act which provides for immunity, gives
healthcare providers statutory protection to carry out a living will
declaration without fear of liability.229
L. THE VALIDITY OF DECLARATIONS MADE IN ANOTHER
STATE OR DECLARATIONS EXECUTED BEFORE JULY
10, 1989
Section 23-06.4-13 of the North Dakota Living Will Act pro-
vides that a declaration executed in another state by a resident of
that state in compliance with the law of that state is validly exe-
cuted for the purposes of the North Dakota Act.23 ° Courts have
recognized the need to accept declarations from residents of other
states, even if the state itself has not yet passed "living will" legisla-
tion.23 1 A declaration from an out-of-state citizen can be consid-
ered as best evidence of their intentions regarding life-prolonging
medical treatment, and be recognized without time-consuming
and expensive court proceedings.2 32
The North Dakota Living Will Act additionally recognizes liv-
ing will declarations executed prior to July 10, 1989.233 The
the immediate aftermath of (a heart attack), there is no duty to continue its use
once it has become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel.
Id.
228. See In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct.) December 11, 1987 at 7.
229. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-11 (Supp. 1989).
230. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-13 (Supp. 1989).
231. See Saunders v. State, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (Sup.Ct. 1985). In
Saunders, Thelma Saunders executed a living will while living in Pennsylvania. Id. She
became ill after moving to New York. Id. Although New York did not have living will
legislation at the time, the Court recognized her living will as an "Informed Medical
Consent Statement," and the best evidence of her decisions regarding life-prolonging
treatment. Id. at 516.
232. Id at 516. The court in Saunders recognized that
The living will ... authorizing the refusal or discontinuance of further medical
treatment in petitioner's case by artificial means and devices.., the petitioner's
wishes are entitled to be fulfilled without need for additional.., time-consuming
and traumatic court proceedings....
Id.
233. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-14 (Supp. 1989). Section 23-06.4-14 provides:
An instrument executed before July 10, 1989, which basically complies with the
intent of subsection 1 of section 23-06.4-03, must be given effect pursuant to this
chapter. A previously executed instrument that purports to comply with the
intent of this chapter is valid for five years from July 19, 1989, unless the
declarant becomes incompetent within five years after the execution of the
declaration and remains incompetent at the time of the determination of a
terminal condition under section 23-6.4-04, in which case the declaration
continues in effect. When the declaration expires, a new declaration must be
executed if the declarant wishes to make a written declaration under this
chapter.
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requirements for recognition include compliance with the intent
of North Dakota's Living Will Act.234 The recognized declaration
executed prior to the effective date will remain effective for a five
year period beginning July 10, 1989, unless the declarant becomes
and remains incompetent and terminally ill during that five year
period.235 When a living will declaration executed prior to July 10,
1989 expires, a new one must be executed if the declarant wishes
to retain a living will.236 Section 23-06.4-14 is the only section of
North Dakota's living will requiring a re-execution after a specific
period of time has passed.2 37 Anyone who has executed a recog-
nized living will prior to July 10, 1989 might alleviate the possibil-
ity of missing the five year deadline by simply re-executing a new
declaration as soon as possible using the statutory format of North
Dakota's living will.238
IV. CONCLUSION
The "right to die," the history of "living wills" and living will
statutes are still in the infancy stages of development. 1976 was a
hallmark year for the right to die issue, marked by the seminal
Quinlan decision,239 which was a major step in the right to die
movement, and the passage of the first state "living will" stat-
ute.24° Since those early years, nearly all of the states have recog-
nized the need for living will legislation, in an effort to encourage
citizens to exercise their right and responsibility to control deci-
sions relating to medical care.24 '
As stated earlier, the scope of the North Dakota Living Will
Act is narrow: applicable only in those cases where the patient is
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. The Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill Act: Hearings on H.B. 1481 Before the Sen.
Comm. on Human Ser. and Vet. Affairs, 51st N.D. Legislative Session (March 3, 1989)
(statement by Sr. Paula Ringuette). The North Dakota Catholic Conference asked the
legislature to include a provision in the living will statute requiring re-execution of a
declaration every five years, unless the declarant would become incompetent prior to the
five year period. Id. This request was considered by the Senate committee, but limited to
declarations executed prior to July 10, 1989. Id. Determining the date of a declarant's
incompetence could be difficult, and a blanket five year re-execution requirement might
invalidate a declaration on a procedural technicality. Id.
238. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-14 (Supp. 1989).
239. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
240. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS (1987 ed.).
California was the first state to pass "living will" legislation in 1976. Arkansas, Nevada,
North Carolina, New Mexico, Oregon, and Texas passed legislation the following year. Id.
at "Checklist Chart of Living Will Laws" (Supp. 1987).
241. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (Supp. 1989) (intent behind North
Dakota's living will is to allow adults to control decisions relating to their medical care).
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diagnosed with a terminal illness and death is imminent.242 Con-
sistent with the precedent set forth in Cruzan, North Dakota's Liv-
ing Will Act is but one method for providing "clear and convincing
evidence" of a patient's desire for withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures.243 Additional ways to provide clear and convincing
evidence of one's wishes upon incapacity could include naming a
surrogate decision maker in the Living Will declaration itself,
through appointment of a proxy, or by executing a durable power
of attorney to be exercised in conjunction with the living will.244
These kinds of additions could safeguard the constitutional rights
to privacy and liberty and common law rights of self determina-
tion not protected by the Living Will Act itself.245 Additionally, as
the legislative intent of the North Dakota Living Will Act recog-
nizes the right of competent adults to control decisions relating to
medical care and encourages communication between an individ-
ual, the family and health care providers,246 it would seem that the
stated intent of the North Dakota Living Will Act, at least implic-
itly, would favor the ability of a declarant to name a surrogate
decision maker under the Act.247
This Note began with a discussion of In re Bayer, the first right
to die case in North Dakota.248 Whether a validly executed living
will would have enabled lone Bayer to forego unwanted life pro-
longing treatment is an unanswered question at this time. How-
ever, a valid living will could have provided her physician with
"clear and convincing evidence" of her feelings against being kept
alive in a persistent vegetative state.2 49 The evidence of Mrs.
Bayer's wishes in the form of a valid living will may have allowed
242. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (Supp. 1989).
243. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
244. For a further discussion of surrogate decisionmaking, see supra notes 46-79 and
accompanying text.
245. Cf. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev.
denied 492 So.2d 1331 (1986) (noting that the Florida living will did not preclude common
law rights).
246. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (Supp. 1989).
247. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-30 (Supp. 1989) (in addition to the required statutory
format, North Dakota Living Will Act allows for additional specific directives). Under
North Dakota's Durable Power of Attorney Act, it is possible to execute a durable power of
attorney for medical decisions. It could be argued that the durable power of attorney could
be incorporated into the living will declaration, and take the form of a specific directive.
Cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03(3) (Supp. 1989). The living will statutes of several other
states allow for the appointment of a proxy decision maker. For a complete list of those
states, see supra note 150.
248. See In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Feb. 5, 1987).
249. Saunders v. State, 129 Misc.2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (Sup. Ct. 1985). The
Saunders court noted the Amicus Curiae brief filed by the Society for the Right to Die on
behalf of Thelma Saunders. Id. The Society "urged the court to find that a Living Will... is
clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wishes, which may be acted upon when the
patient is incompetent and without hope of recovery." Id.
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her physician to work with her family, to abide by those wishes.2"'
The North Dakota Living Will Act is a first step for the North
Dakota legislature in dealing with the right to refuse medical
treatment - an issue which courts such as the Bayer court, have
acknowledged and requested legislative direction with.2 5 1 Com-
pared to some other states, the North Dakota Living Will Act is a
relatively conservative act; nutrition and hydration and comfort
care are excluded from the definition of "life-prolonging treat-
meni," 252 the declarations of pregnant individuals are invalid dur-
ing their pregnancy with the exception of very limited
circumstances, 253 and the attending physician is neither obligated
to follow the declaration,25 4 nor required to take any action "con-
trary to reasonable medical standards. 255
The cases that involve "living wills" are very few in number,
and generally concern the interplay between the constitutional
and common law rights to self determination, and the restrictions
on those rights as defined by a living will statute.5 6 The majority
of the amendments to the living will statutes in states which have
enacted such laws are not a result of changes in the common law,
but a result of advances in medicine, and rapid changes in atti-
tudes about the rights of the terminally ill to refuse or prolong
treatment which will artificially prolong their life.2 57
North Dakota's Living Will Act has only been effective since
July 19, 1989. Questions about its validity, its effectiveness, and
the extent of its usage will likely remain unanswered for some
time. At this point, however, the Living Will Act is a first step in
recognizing the right of an individual to have a voice in medical
250. For a discussion of the doctrine of substituted judgment, and a doctrine of
informed consent, see supra notes 41-79 and accompanying text.
251. See also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2859
(1990XScalia, J., concurring):
I would have preferred that we announce, clearly and promptly, that the federal
courts have no business in this field (right to die cases) ... (and) it is up to the
citizens of Missouri to decide, through their elected representatives, whether
that wish (to refuse appropriate measures necessary to preserve one's life) will be
honored.
Id.
252. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02.4 (Supp. 1989).
253. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07.4 (Supp. 1989).
254. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-04 (Supp. 1989).
255. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-11.6 (Supp. 1989).
256. See Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d. 368, 372 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986) (a state living
will statute must be read cumulatively with existing law, and cannot impair or restrict the
constitutional right to refuse treatment).
257. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS (1987) at 6.
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treatment decisions until the moment of death, and the statutory
mechanism to assert that right.
Leslie B. Oliver

